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ONTARIO WORKS: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
IAN MORRISON*
RtsuMIt
La Loi de 1997 sur la riforme de l'aide sociale constitue la premiere rdvision
importante des lois sur l'aide sociale depuis la cr6ation d'un regime moderne dans les
ann6es soixante. Parmi les lois cr66es par la Loi sur la riforme de l'aide sociale, on
compte une loi qui remplace la Loi sur l'aide sociale g&irale. Dans cet article, on
pr~sente une analyse pr~liminaire de la Loi sur le programme Ontario au travail et
des premieres 6tapes du programme Ontario au travail dans le contexte du mouvement
de ressac contre l'aide sociale qui a aid6 le Parti progressiste conservateur de 1' Ontario
A remporter l'6lection en 1995. Dans cet article, on examine 6galement comment les
principaux 616ments id6ologiques de ce mouvement de ressac et les autres prescrip-
tions de politiques sociales n6o-conservatrices se sont int6gr~s h la structure juridique
de la prestation de services d'aide sociale en Ontario.
Anyone in Ontario with the courage to say the words "welfare
reform" in public has the attention of most taxpayers.
-Mike Harris1
A. INTRODUCTION
Welfare reform is not a new item on the Ontario public agenda, but the Progressive
Conservative government elected in 1995 is the first in modern Ontario history
actually to succeed in changing the legislative framework for social assistance. On
November 27, 1997, Bill 142, the Social Assistance Reform Act ("SARA") received
Royal Assent, the first significant overhaul of Ontario social assistance legislation
since the 1960s. SARA replaces the two main Acts that have governed social assistance
administration in Ontario for thirty years, the General Welfare Assistance Act ("GWA")
and the Family Benefits Act ("FBA "),2 with the Ontario Works Act ("OWA") and the
Ontario Disability Support Plan Act ("ODSPA"). SARA changes the social assistance
landscape in Ontario to no small degree. People with disabilities who meet a stringent
Ian Morrison is a lawyer and Executive Director of the Clinic Resource Office of the Ontario Legal
Aid Plan, and co-Chair of Workfare Watch, a joint project of the Ontario Social Safety NetWork
and the Community Social Planning Council of Toronto. The opinions expressed in the article are
solely those of the author.
1. M. Harris, "Welfare should offer a hand up, not a hand-out" (May 1995) Policy Options 33.
2. R.S.O 1990 c. G6 and R.S.O. 1990 c. F2, respectively.
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test will receive benefits and additional supports under the ODSPA.3 All others in need
will have to look to "Ontario Works" for assistance. 4
This article is a preliminary examination of issues and concerns arising from the
Ontario Works Act, which is scheduled for proclamation sometime in the spring or
summer of 1998. 5 In all likelihood this Act will form the legislative framework for
social assistance delivery for many years. It deserves careful scrutiny by anyone
concerned about the future of social policy in Ontario.
B. THE REFORM MOMENTUM
Tired of your job? Sick of working 40 hours or more each week to
feed your family? Would you like to relax all day and still have all
the benefits of a full time job? If you answered "yes" to any of these




The modern history of social assistance legislation in Canada begins in 1966 with the
enactment of the federal Canada Assistance Plan,7 the program under which the
government of Canada undertook to share the costs of provincial social assistance on
a dollar for dollar basis. With its emphasis on the provision of adequate assistance to
all persons in need in the context of a overarching social goal of eliminating the
conditions giving rise to poverty, its prohibition of residency requirements and
workfare and its insistence on the creation of a formal appeals process in social
assistance legislation, CAP signalled a major shift in the Canadian welfare state
towards an "entitlement" model of social assistance. Ontario moved shortly thereafter
to entrench the basic CAP requirements in provincial legislation and signed a cost-
sharing agreement with the federal government to take advantage of this. 8
The "entitlement" model of social assistance was strongly reaffirmed in Ontario, at
least in public and political discourse, with the influential 1988 Transitions Report,9
the final report of the Social Assistance Review Committee, which was established
3. For a preliminary analysis of ODSPA issues see H. Beatty, "Social Assistance Reform Act, 1997
Analysis Revised Version", (Nov./Dec. 1997) ARCH*TYPE 20.
4. In this article "OWA" will refer to the Act itself; I use the term "Ontario Works" more generally to
refer to the new welfare program under the Act, including regulations, policies and administration.
5. At the time of writing the projected proclamation date for the OWA is May 1, 1998 (but this has already
been pushed back several times.) The ODSPA is not expected to be proclaimed until sometime later.
6. Extract from anti-welfare material in common circulation in the 1990s.
7. R.S.C. 1995 c.C-1. ("CAP").
8. See J. Struthers, The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario, 1920-1970 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1994) for the history of these developments in Ontario; see also R. Haddow, Poverty
Reform in Canada, 1958-1978 (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).
9. Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1988).
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after the 1985 provincial election and which held extensive and highly publicized
hearings into the social assistance system throughout Ontario in the mid-1980s. While
Transitions did recommend strengthening the connection between employability
enhancement and the right to income support, it did so in the context of a basic
principle of a right to assistance on the basis of need and an assumption that social
assistance programming should be part of a broader anti-poverty strategy. It also
accepted the (at the time) largely uncontroversial proposition that welfare rates were
inadequate and argued strongly for enriching benefits as a way of enabling social
participation by recipients.
Although never fully implemented, Transitions was one of the most influential policy
pieces in modem social assistance history. Based on Transitions and other recommen-
dations of the Social Assistance Review Committee both the Liberal and, after 1990,
the NDP provincial governments made a number of significant program changes,
including substantial rate increases, based on the Transitions vision, if not always on
its explicit recommendations. These included extending eligibility to many working
poor families, broadening eligibility criteria (such as the 1987 changes which allowed
unmarried recipients to cohabit for three years before being considered a family unit
for benefit purposes) and a comprehensive overhaul of the patronage-ridden and
discredited appeals system. However, neither government actually succeeded in
enacting new legislation to consolidate these changes.
Progressive welfare reform of any kind foundered in the 1990s recession, in the face
of the most dramatic caseload increases since the Depression. The percentage of the
Ontario population receiving social assistance rose from about 4.5% in 1985 to a peak
of 12.2%-about 1.3 million people-in 1994.10 Altogether, social assistance expen-
ditures rose by 37.2% in 1990/91, by 42.5% in 1991/92 and by 20.7% in 1992/93. By
1995, these expenditures exceeded $6 billion annually in Ontario. The financial burden
was exacerbated by the federal government's unilateral decision to cap social assis-
tance transfer payments to Ontario under the CAP cost-sharing agreement. I Although
the NDP government continued to talk about welfare reform, any realistic possibility
of expansionary reform was dead by 1992.
With one in nine Ontarians on the welfare rolls, the increased visibility of the program
fuelled increasing resentment of both the system and the people who used it. By the
mid-1 990s, a public backlash against welfare-always the least popular social welfare
10. Note: All statistical references to caseload and financial data in this article are from information
generated by the Statistics and Analysis Unit of the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Ser-
vices, unless specifically indicated otherwise. Most of this information is unpublished and much has
been taken from documents released in the course of litigation.
11. The federal government announced in 1990 that it was unilaterally capping its cost-sharing contribu-
tions to Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. In 1995 it announced that CAP would be repealed ef-
fective April 1, 1996, to be replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer, a block fund which
did away with targetted social assistance funding and removed all but one of the CAP conditions for
social assistance programs: Budget Implementation Act, 1995, S.C. 1995 c.17, Part V. The "cap on
CAP", coming when it did, cost Ontario billions of dollars in foregone transfer payments.
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program in Canada 12-was becoming increasingly apparent. Welfare became even
more of a flashpoint for a complicated set of public fears, anxieties and anger towards
racial minorities, immigrants, "criminals", teens, single mothers and so on. 13 The NDP
government made some attempt to appease these sentiments, announcing "anti-fraud"
initiatives and imposing selective cuts and eligibility restrictions, but its measures
mostly just succeeded in causing hardship for some recipients without garnering any
further electoral support.14 The Progressive Conservatives, then the third place op-
position party, capitalized brilliantly on this backlash, constantly attacking the NDP
government both inside and outside the Legislature over supposed welfare "waste"
and "abuse". In the 1995 election campaign, the Harris Tories made welfare reform a
central plank in their platform, the "Common Sense Revolution". They promised to
slash "cadillac" welfare rates, to make all "able-bodied" recipients including single
mothers work for their welfare, and to root out "fraud and abuse". As James Struthers
observes, the 1995 Ontario election campaign "was the first provincial contest in
Ontario since the Great Depression in which welfare was a core issue, indeed perhaps
the core issue". 15 [emphasis added]
After its June 1995 election victory, the Harris government moved quickly on this
agenda. 16 Allowances were cut by 21.6% to all classes of recipients except FB
disability recipients. Rule changes resulted in the disqualification of tens of thousands
of peoples. 17 The 'anti-fraud' program included a provincial welfare "hotline" to
12. Federal government polling for the 1994 social policy review, for example, showed support for in-
dividual programs ranging from 94% for the disabled and 90% for seniors, to 50% for welfare, and
further found that "support at the bottom end [i.e., for welfare programs] is significantly lower when
the public has to make choices": Social Security Reform Communications" (March 21, 1994) [Inter-
nal document, not released; marked confidential].
13. Several studies in the 1990s found race, immigration and perceived welfare abuse as linked issues:
e.g., see Ekos Research Associates, Final Report: National Opinion Study on Changes to Immigra-
tion Policy (1992); Ekos Research Associates, Setting the Domestic and International Context for
Immigration Policy: Changing Societal Perspectives (1994); Peter Harder, Deputy Minister, Citizen-
ship and Immigration Canada, Memorandum to the Minister (December 1994). See also L. Noce &
A. O'Connell, Speaking Out Project: Periodic Report #1, Take It or Leave It: The Ontario
Government's Approach to Job Insecurity, (Toronto: Caledon Institute of Social Policy, January
1998) 19-20.
14. For review of NDP policy initiatives to control welfare expenditures during the recession and their
consequences, see I. Morrison et al, "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review" (1993), 9 J. L &
Social Pol'y 1; R. Ellsworth et al., "Poverty Law In Ontario: The Year in Review" (1994) 10 J.L.&
Social Pol'y I; I.Morrison & G. Pearce, "Under the Axe: Social Assistance In Ontario in 1995"
(1995), 11 J.L.& Social Pol'y 1.
15. J. Struthers, Can Workfare Work? Reflections From History (Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social
Policy, 1996).
16. I will not review these changes in detail here. See also A. Moscovitch, "Social Assistance In the New
Ontario", in D. Ralph et al, ed., Open for Business, Closed to People: Mike Harris's Ontario
(Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1997); National Council of Welfare, Another Look at Welfare
Reform (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), pp. 50-69.
17. These included rule changes that disqualified post-secondary students from welfare; changes to the
definition of "spouse" which resulted in more than 10,000 recipients being disqualified; and further
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report alleged welfare cheats, increased information demands from recipients, more
intensive eligibility investigations and increased information sharing with other
provincial ministries, agencies and other govemments. At the same time, government
funding of a wide range of community services and supports which assist low income
and vulnerable individuals was slashed. Life for social assistance recipients-and for
the growing numbers of people in Ontario who have fallen through the social safety
net altogether, has grown increasingly harsh.18 The incidence and depth of poverty at
the lowest income levels-and the social, health and other consequences of this-have
grown increasingly alarming, even as the provincial economy is booming in other




Perhaps the most notable feature of the Ontario Works Act is not what it contains, but
what it does not. Despite its length-80 sections compared to the 16 sections of the
GWA-the OWA remains skeletal legislation. The heart of the Act lies in its extraor-
dinarily sweeping regulation-making powers. One subsection alone of s.74, the
principle regulation-making power, has 49 subparagraphs-some of which themselves
contain multiple regulation-making powers. This choice of legislative vehicles has
extremely important implications both for the role of "law" in relation to the future of
the program and for the whole political future of social assistance policy in Ontario.
The skeletal nature of the legislation has some important consequences for the future
of the Ontario Works program which are worth noting at the outset of an analysis of
the program. For most practical purposes, traditional legal advocacy will have even
less capacity to have an impact on the welfare system than it did under previous
legislation. First, as I will discuss more fully below, the Act contains no entitlements
or program standards of any kind that cannot be limited, restricted or abrogated by
regulation. Except for any constraints imposed by the common law and the Charter
of Rights-modest constraints on any realistic scenario 19-legal advocates will have
few if any useful external levers with which to influence the system. Furthermore, as
restrictions on teen welfare eligibility.
18. E.g., see I. Morrison, Ontario's Welfare Rate Cuts: An Anniversary Report (Ontario Social Safety
Network, October 1996); Metropolitan Toronto, Commissioner of Social Services, Impacts of
General Welfare Assistance Rate Reductions (27 May 1996); Metropolitan Toronto, Report from
Evictions Sub-Committee of Metro Advisory Committee on Homeless and Socially Isolated Persons
(1 May 1996), Daily Bread Food Bank, Creating Hunger: Impact of Ontario Government Welfare
Reforms (10 July 1996).
19. The role of the Charter of Rights in relation to social assistance programs is beyond the scope of this
article and will not be discussed further here. It is sufficient to note for present purposes that apart
from the many doctrinal problems and issues in this area, the practical and logistical problems of
mounting Charter challenges in this area are particularly serious.
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discussed below, the statutory appeals system under the OWA has been so truncated
that it is unlikely to play any significant role in supervising or controlling the welfare
system even in routine matter.
Even more importantly, regulations and policies can be (and in the case of social
assistance almost invariably are) promulgated without notice, consultation or debate.
Under the OWA, the government of the day will be free to make even the most radical
changes to the social assistance system without submitting them to the legislative
process. Thus, social assistance policy authority has been removed almost entirely
from the formal political process. Proposed changes need not be submitted to the
legislature nor subjected to any prior scrutiny. Moreover, there is little or no chance,
at least under the current government, that those affected by these changes will have
any input into the policy making process before new regulations are promulgated.
Where government action affects powerful or politically influential constituencies, the
policy making process is generally open to some degree of public influence, even
where the action is outside the formal legislative process. The poor and disadvantaged,
on the other hand, are usually excluded from such input. In the case of welfare policy
at least, this exclusion is deliberate.2 0
For all its length and complexity, the OWA is a shell. Welfare policy and programming
remain more firmly than ever entrenched in the Executive branch and welfare
bureaucracy.
2. Welfare Reform In Demographic Context
In December 1997 the combined FB and GWcaseload was 548,857 cases or 1,098,659
beneficiaries, about 9.6% of the provincial population and two fifths of all social
assistance recipients in Canada.21 Welfare caseloads are very fluid with many people
entering and leaving the system every month; thus, far more people use social
assistance in the course of a year than "snapshot" statistics indicate.22 In this section
20. The Harris government refuses to meet or consult with welfare recipients or their advocates on any
issues of social assistance policy. A ministerial advisory council of social assistance recipients-estab-
lised by the NDP government was disbanded immediately after the election. One of the first policy
changes made at the Ministry of Community and Social Services ("MCSS") after the election was a
direction that opinions would only be sought from "taxpayers", not "special interest groups" (i.e.,
recipients and their advocates): see Patricia Spindel, "The Strategic Ministry Initiatives Demys-
tified", in "COMSOC Officials Learn Tory Language", Ontario Social Safety NetWork, Social
Safety News (June 1996). As I discuss further below, the distinction between "taxpayers" and "de-
pendents" is now formally entrenched in the OWA.
21. Social assistance is provided to single persons or to "heads of household". A "case" is a benefit unit,
which may include more than one "beneficiary" (e.g., spouses and dependent children). In December
1997, there were 165,490 FB disability cases (275,515 beneficiares); 153,978 GW and FB sole sup-
port parent cases (450,799 beneficiaries); 141,671 GW "employables", (270,816 beneficiaries); and
31,015 GW "ill health" cases (48,038 beneficiaries), plus a small number of people in other
categories.
22. There appear to be no readily available statistics on these figures for Ontario. An Alberta study found
that the number of unique cases (i.e., individuals actually receiving assistance) was twice the average
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I will briefly review the demographic context of welfare use, the changes that will
result from the implementation of SARA and the factors affecting caseload trends in
Ontario.
a. Ontario Works caseload composition
Ontario Works replaces municipal "general welfare". The largest group of municipal
welfare recipients has traditionally been the so-called "employable" category. This
group included both single adults without dependants and couples with or without
children, but historically single men predominated in the "employable" class. This
pattern has already changed markedly since 1995, as the number of single recipients
has declined and the proportionate share of families has increased. Ontario Works will
cause even more notable demographic changes.
The most immediately obvious changes will result from the transfer of sole support
parents from the FB caseload to Ontario Works. 23 SARA marks the end of "Mothers
Allowance", the first state operated social assistance program ever enacted in On-
tario.24 Over the course of 1998, approximately 100,000 sole support parents (over
90% of whom are women) will be shifted to the Ontario Works caseloads. However,
there will also be more gradual changes to the demographics of the welfare caseload.
As of January 1, 1998, the "near-aged" (people between 60 and 64 years old) lose FB
eligibility and must apply for municipal welfare. 25 Even more important in numerical
terms is the treatment of the "near-disabled". The ODSPA definition of disability will
exclude many people who would have qualified for FB benefits as "permanently
unemployable" ("PUE"),26 who make up roughly half the current FB disability
benefits caseload. Current PUE recipients are to be grandparented under ODSPA, but
caseload and average recipient figures: Canada West Foundation, Making Ends Meet: Income Sup-
port in Alberta (Calgary: March 1997) at 16, Fig. 18. I have been informed by a senior Metro Toron-
to welfare official that the number of cases served in a year in Toronto is about 180% of the average
monthly caseload.
23. Approximately three quarters of sole support parents on social assistance in Ontario receive FB; the
remaining one quarter are already on municipal welfare.
24. The first Ontario Mothers Allowance Act was enacted in 1920. Mothers Allowance disappeared as a
separate program with passage of the Family Benefits Act in 1968, but sole support mothers retained
specific statutory entitlements under the FBA. For a history of Mothers Allowance and the erosion of
women's capacity to make claims on the state as mothers and caregivers, see M. Little, "No Car, No
Radio, No Liquor Permit": The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers In Ontario [forthcoming Oxford
University Press, 1998]; and see also P.Evans, "Single Mothers and Ontario's Welfare Policy:
Restructuring the Debate", in J.Brodie ed., Women and Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Harcourt
Brace, 1996).
25. About 9000 people received FB benefits in this category in 1995. People on FB in this category as of
January 1, 1998 have been grandparented, but all new applicants after that date must apply to On-
tario Works: SARA, Sched. D. s. 1. (About 8000 people over age 65 also receive FB and will probab-
ly be left on ODSPA.).
26. O.Reg. 366 s. 1(5). These are typically people who do not have a severe disability but whose medical
conditions in combination with age, work history, educational level or other barriers make them "un-
able to engage in remunerative employment".
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it seems that eventually thousands of people who would formerly have-qualified for
disability benefits will be forced onto Ontario Works, where they will be subject to
workfare requirements.
These shifts have important implications for program administration. Over the last
several years average lengths of stay on assistance have increased notably.27 This trend
will probably increase as Ontario Works caseloads absorb sole support mothers and
the "near-disabled". 28 In other words, welfare caseloads will increasingly be made up
of people who for whatever reason have significant barriers to labour force participa-
tion. It is not yet clear how the employment component of Ontario Works will respond
to this, but there is no question that these shifts will impose new pressures on
employment programs. I will discuss these issues further below when I return to look
in more detail at employment issues under Ontario Works.
b. Ontario Works caseload trends
Social assistance caseloads have dropped sharply since 1995, although they remain
high by historical standards. The reasons for the decline are not entirely clear.
Increased employment and earnings are part of the answer but not the full story.29
Some people have moved to other income maintenance programs; some are doubling
up with friends and families; many have become homeless and are either provided for
in shelters (where they do not appear in welfare caseload figures) or not at all; some
have decided to remain in or return to abusive living situations rather than seek or
remain on welfare; some have left the province. How many people have left welfare
for good and how many may be forced to reapply as they exhaust alternatives is also
unknown, as there is little or no reliable current information on welfare re-entry rates.
Most studies of caseload changes only look at people leaving the system, but it seems
that the decline (at least for municipal programs) was due more to declining applica-
tions than to increased rates of exit (except for mass disentitlements because of rule
changes), the reasons for which can mostly only be speculated on.
30
27. The average length of time on assistance for GW employables went from 7.6 months in 1998 to 14.6
months in 1995 to 18 months in December 1997.
28. The average stay of sole support parents on FB in December 1997 was 57.8 months and for disabled
persons was 87.1 months.
29. The Ontario government claims that 60% or more of those who have left welfare in Ontario have
found work, based on The Levy-Coughlin Partnership, A Survey of People Who Have Left Social As-
sistance (October 1996). This claim is not supported by most other studies, which suggest that
employment accounts for more like 40-45% of welfare exits; see Metropolitan Toronto, Commis-
sioner of Social Services, Survey of Clients Exiting General Welfare Assistance: Key Findings and
Implications, Report to Human Services Committee (February 1997); D. Jaffray & W. Kowalski,
Leaving Welfare in the Winter of 1995-96 (Hamilton: Social Planning Council of Hamilton-
Wentworth, October 1996); Ottawa-Carleton Social Services Planning and Review Division, Reason
for Termination Study (April 1996). See also Canada West Foundation, Where Are They Now: As-
sessing the Impact of Welfare Reform on Former Recipients (Calgary: September 1997), which made
similar findings.
30. This was true for Metropolitan Toronto at any rate; Metropolitan Toronto, Commissioner of Social
Services, Impacts of General Welfare Assistance Rate Reductions (27 May 1996); Personal com-
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At the time of writing the decline in welfare caseloads has slowed. Caseloads have
even shown small increases for a few months but so many variables affect this trend
that predictions are almost impossible. Obviously, what happens to this trend is very
important for the future of Ontario Works. Unemployment was not the only cause of
increased caseloads in the 1990s. There were, and are, many other pressures: these
include the restructuring of the labour market; massive cuts to other federal and
provincial income maintenance programs; long term deinstitutionalization of disabled
people; the increased incidence of sole support parent families, etc. My analysis of
caseload demographic changes suggests that Ontario Works caseloads will become
increasingly less responsive to labour market improvements. Moreover, any serious
economic downturn would mean a flood of new "employable" applicants. In short, it
would not take much for welfare demand to start to grow sharply again.
Of course caseloads are not solely governed by external demand. Governments have
many ways to reduce caseloads when the market refuses to work its miracles. The
most dramatic strategies can already be seen in operation in the U.S., where welfare
"reform" has included large scale categorical disentitlements (many states now pro-
vide no general assistance to single "employable" recipients) and lifetime limits on
welfare receipt. Such measures have not yet been openly proposed in Ontario but more
subtle forms of bureaucratic disentitlement are common enough.31 The OWA greatly
expands the opportunities for this, as discussed below.
3. Ontario Works Delivery and Administration
Ontario Works is part of a massive reorganization of provincial-municipal relations.
For social assistance administration, this includes new cost-sharing arrangements,
delivery site amalgamation, a new technological infrastructure and many other chan-
ges. Some aspects of these changes have important implications for program design
and delivery.
a. The Delivery Framework
Ontario is one of the few remaining provinces to retain a two-tier social assistance
delivery system. Prior to Bill 142, general welfare was administered by over 300
municipal welfare delivery sites, ranging from Metropolitan Toronto, the largest
delivery site in the province, to tiny unconsolidated municipalities. The two-tier
system is retained under SARA. Disability benefits will still be administered by the
province. Ontario Works will be delivered municipally, but will be consolidated from
the current patchwork to about 50 delivery sites for welfare, social housing and child
munication, senior Metro policy analyst (January 1998).
31. For example, an internal Alberta government report on falling welfare caseloads in 1993/94 at-
tributed success in large part to frontline workers who employed a "conscious and vigorous deflec-
tion strategy" which included the "sometimes undesirable task to advise applicants that welfare was a
last resort not a convenience": [Alberta] Welfare Reforms 1993: Caseload Impacts (October 1994).
For a different perspective on what this "conscious deflection strategy" meant to people seeking as-
sistance in Alberta, see J. Murphy, "Alberta and the Workfare Myth", E.Schragge ed., Workfare:
Ideology for a New Under-Class (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1997).
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care. Generally the upper tier municipality in regional municipalities will be respon-
sible for these services. In counties with separated municipalities a single municipality
will be responsible for all social services, and counties and municipalities of less than
50,000 will be required to combine delivery.32
The province has also decided to transfer more social assistance costs to the municipal
tax base, rather than take over social assistance funding (contrary to the recommen-
dations of every study that has ever examined the question, including its own "Who
Does What" panel). 33 Municipalities formerly paid 20% of general welfare benefits
(plus 50% of welfare administration costs and the costs of some discretionary
benefits). The province paid 100% of FB costs. Now, municipalities will pay 80% of
all benefits plus 50% of all administrative costs (including ODSPA). The exercise
leaves municipalities in a highly vulnerable position. Social assistance costs are
unpredictable compared to the costs that have been removed from municipal control.
Municipalities now face far greater exposure to economic downturns or other caseload
pressures in the future. It is also by no means clear that this is the last word on funding
arrangements. At the time of writing it is rumoured that the province intends to
establish population-based caseload targets for municipalities (a practice now in some
U.S. states); municipalities will be financially penalized for failing to meet caseload
targets (and presumably rewarded for exceeding them).
Municipal delivery will also continue to exacerbate tensions and irritation between
municipalities. The complicated municipal cost-sharing arrangements introduced by
Ontario to placate Toronto reactions to downloading will keep the opportunities for
resentment high, 34 but the issues do not stop there. There have always been accusations
of municipal "dumping" of welfare cases onto each other. These took a particularly
ugly turn in 1997 when Toronto began offering families living in shelters assistance
to relocate to other municipalities where vacancy rates were higher and shelter costs
lower, while mental health agencies in other regions admitted giving homeless men-
tally ill clients one-way bus tickets to Toronto. 35
b. Program Authority In Ontario Works
Policy authority in welfare programs has always been a contentious issue, as
municipalities had to deliver and partly fund a program for which the province made
the rules. Under the GWA, the Director of Income Maintenance was required to
32. Ontario, Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment Social and Community Health Services Im-
plementation Project, Consolidation of Municipal Services Management: Consolidation Planning
Framework: Southern Ontario (January 1998) at 3.
33. Ontario, Recommendations of the Social Services Sub-panel of the Who Does What Commission (11
October 1996).
34. Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing News Release, Province Modifies Plan to
Equalize GTA Social Costs (12 December 1997).
35. E.g., see J. Harder, "Exporting the Dole: Smaller centres get welfare cases" Toronto Sun (20 Decem-
ber 1997); J. Wallace, "Ticket to nowhere? Towns dump mentally ill on Toronto" Toronto Sun (4
February 1998)..
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"exercise general supervision" over administration of the Act and to "advise" ad-
ministrators "as to the manner in which their duties should be carried out". 36 Appoint-
ment of a welfare administrator required the "approval of the Minister", although
the administrator was a municipal employee. The scope of the Director's super-
visory powers was never really settled and it seems that neither province nor
municipalities were too anxious to test this issue. 37 More regional variation in
delivery standards existed than could ever be gleaned from a simple reading of
regulations and policies.
While municipalities will be responsible for delivering Ontario Works, the province
will continue to set the rules. The OWA sets out provincial powers in much more detail
than previous legislation, both directly and through the regulation making powers. 38
The province also holds a powerful lever over municipal behaviour through the
Ontario Works cost-sharing mechanisms. However, while the province clearly has the
legal authority to micromanage Ontario Works, it is not clear just how far this power
will be exercised. Social assistance is a complex and volatile political subject.
Municipalities are fully aware that they may be blamed for program failures--espe-
cially workfare-and that they face a serious crisis if economic circumstances change;
consequently, municipalities have demanded more say in welfare policy. One internal
document suggests that the Ministry anticipates regional variation due to political
pressures, noting that "demands from taxpayers, politicians, clients and employees
may vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction across Ontario, creating
pressure for flexible delivery solutions".
39
c. Program Administration and the "Business Transformation Project"
The bottom line of today's reform efforts is for government to focus
on giving people a hand up, not a hand out.40
Not, as might be thought, a quote from an Ontario politician, this statement is from a
1996 press release by American giant Andersen Consulting, the world's largest
management consulting firm and a key player in the redesign of Ontario's social
assistance system. In February 1997, the province announced that it had contracted
with Andersen for its "Business Transformation Project" ("BTP") to involve "the
36. GWA s.3.
37. But see the 1993/94 stand-off between Lambton County and MCSS over a proposal to have a
municipal politician review a list of all the welfare recipients in the County: see R. Ellsworth et al,
"Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review" (1994), 10 J.L. & Social Pol'y 1 at 13.
38. See generally OWA Part III; and s.74. An important new power in the OWA is the Minister's power
to issue policy statements with the force of regulation determining how the Act and regulations are to
be interpreted: s.74(2)3.
39. Ontario, Business Transformation Project Municipal Blueprint Working Group, Social Assistance
Blueprint Task Order (June 1997) ("Blueprint") at 6.
40. Andersen Consulting, Press Release (Washington: 3 September 1996), "States Eager to Reform
Welfare, But Are They Ready for Change? Andersen Consulting Study of State Welfare Leaders
Offers Insight".
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redesign of both technology and business processes". 41 In return for a massive
overhaul of service delivery, Andersen is to receive a percentage of the "savings" it
can generate, anticipated to be up to $180 million over the course of the contract. The
new computer system is intended not only to replace the seriously outdated FB system
but also to link all OWA sites into one province-wide system.42
The BPT is much more than a computer system update, though. It is also clearly linked
to the goal of 'reforming' the roughly 3800 caseworkers, who are themselves identified
as possible barriers to reform.Thus, an internal BPT document insists that the "level
of advocacy/ handholding [i.e., by welfare workers] will decrease" and suggests that
reorientation of caseworkers "requires a significant culture shift (shared values and
beliefs) centered around client self-sufficiency and focus on performance outcomes
and measures [sic]". 43 A comprehensive review of the implications of the BTP is not
possible here but it would be hard to overstate its importance. Political welfare reform
rhetoric is often unrecognizable by the time it has been translated through bureaucratic
structures to the front-line worker level at which programs are actually delivered. 44
Social assistance program administration involves huge areas of de facto discretion
which often has little to do with formal rules and policies. In modem office environ-
ments, what is allowed and not allowed by computer programs is often a more
important determinant of worker behaviour than legal rules.
d. The future of welfare administration: "Welfare Inc."?
Welfare as we know it is coming to an end. It's being privatized.
Within a few years, welfare will be a multi-billion dollar industry,
tightly regulated by government, but run in many states by high-tech
giants such as Lockheed Martin IMS, Andersen Consulting, EDS,
Unisys and IBM.45
Potentially, the most radical administrative changes under Ontario Works lie in the
possibility of privatizing welfare services. The OWA contains sweeping powers to
contract out delivery and administration. In contrast to the ODSPA, which reserves
responsibility for income support to the province (although it allows for privatization
of employment services), the OWA allows for contracting out of virtually every aspect
of service delivery.46 Private sector involvement is already either explicitly or implicit-
41. Ontario, MCSS News Release Backgrounder, Business Transfonnation Project (February 1997).
42. Currently, MCSS has one computer system, the "CIMS" system, linked to some but not all
municipal welfare offices. Metro Toronto has a separate system, the "MAIN" system. Some
municipalities have no computer links.
43. Blueprint, supra n.39 at 14, 16.
44. E.g., see N. Des Rosiers and B. Feldthusen, "Discretion in Social Assistance Legislation" (1992) 8 J.Law
and Social Pol'y 204; M. Meyers, B. Glaser & K. MacDonald, "On the Front Lines of Welfare Delivery:
Are Workers Implementing Policy Reforms?" (1998), 17 J. Policy Analysis and Management 1.
45. D. Jones, "Private firms eye $28 billion welfare prize", USA Today (21 October 1996) IA.
46. See OWA s. 45 (delivery agent may "enter into an agreement for any matter relating to the ad-
ministration of this Act or the provision of assistance" ); s. 48(2) (Director may "enter into an agree-
Ontario Works: A Preliminary Assessment
ly envisaged in parts of the Ontario Works program. For example, under current
policies aspects of employment services must be tendered to the private sector; while
new technologies such as fingerscanning will clearly depend on the private sector.
This does not mean that a sell-off of welfare programs will happen soon or at all. The
issue is obviously a delicate one and the province has already moved to rein in some
municipal initiatives: a recent MCSS directive reminds welfare administrators that
welfare staff must carry out core income maintenance functions and that "services
must not be externally delivered to a point where this does not occur".47 Major short
term changes are unlikely in any event due to the sheer size and inertia of the system.
Initial Ontario Works Business Plans involve a three year funding schedule and assume
municipal delivery. While the province could unilaterally alter these arrangements,
this would be politically difficult.
The longer term is harder to predict. Welfare privatization is a major issue in the U.S.,
pursued aggressively by large corporations. 48 To date, most privatization has been in
peripheral services or technological support, not core income support, but pressures
on core programs are increasing: Texas, for example, has proposed to contract out its
entire welfare system.49 The privatization momentum is rapidly increasing as the
federal government loosens control over state programs and shifts to block funding
take place.50 Even if the outcomes cannot be predicted, it must be assumed that the
issue is a serious one for Ontario. This is a huge topic that cannot be fully debated
here. However, some obvious concerns can be identified, particularly from the U.S.
experience. There have been many scandals involving incompetent performance,
allegations of conflict of interest, massive cost over-runs and other problems. 51 A study
ment with regard to any matter relating to the administration of this Act or the provision of assis-
tance"); and s. 49(1) (Minister may "enter into an agreement with a band or person" to "exercise the
powers and duties of a delivery agent in a geographic area").
47. Ontario, MCSS, Ontario Works Delivery Requirements for Social Services Administrators, SAPB
9716 (17 November 1997).
48. B. Ehrenreich, "Spinning the poor into gold: How corporations seek to profit from welfare reform"
Harpers Magazine (August 1997) 44; J. Carlin, "How to profit from the poor; Corporate America is
queueing up to privatise the welfare system", The Independent (21 September 1996) [The World,
p.12]; N. Bernstein, "Giant companies entering race to run state welfare programs", The New York
Times (15 September 1996); J. Jeter, "Firms line up in Maryland to cash in on welfare shift", The
Washington Post (27 May 1996).
49. L. Griffin, "State awaits word on welfare overhaul; Plans to privatize programs worrying some" The Dal-
las Morning News (22 July 1996) 15A. The Texas plan has been stalled because the federal government
has so far refused to give necessary waivers to allow food stamps eligibility to be determined by non-state
employees: CLASP Update (Washington: Centre for Law and Social Policy: 21 May 1997). Texas has not
abandoned its plan, however, and at the time of writing Florida has made a similar proposal.
50. U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Service Privatization: Expansion Poses Challenges in En-
suring Accountability for Program Results (October 1997) GAO/HEHS-98-6, 2 ("Social Service
Privatization").
51. Service Employees International Union, Contracting Human Services: Recurring Scandals and Bad
Performance (May 1997); Service Employees International Union, Big Bucks Bonanza - Welfare
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by the U.S. General Accounting Office raised other concerns: the lack of qualified
bidders to create real competition and thus monopolistic trends (a situation likely to
worsen if a few large companies come to dominate this area); lack of local government
experience in developing contracts that specified outcomes in ways that would
effectively hold contractors accountable; 52 and weaknesses in monitoring which made
it difficult to ensure that all intended beneficiaries had access to services. 53 Obviously
all of these could be serious issues in Ontario.
For now, the most important point may just be that welfare privatization has entered
political discourse. Privatization as an idea may be enough to influence the future
development of the welfare system. In the U.S., local government deliverers have been
forced to bid for service delivery 'contracts' or to meet arbitrary caseload reduction goals
in order to retain the delivery function. Even before the OWA became law, similar threats
were floated in Ontario against municipal reluctance to implement workfare. 54
4. Benefits Under The OWA
a. Eligibility and entitlement
The OWA says little specifically about eligibility and entitlement. Anyone in need who
cannot meet the ODSPA disability definition will have to apply for OWA benefits.
However, the Act contains no general principle of entitlement; indeed, it specifically
provides that in addition to all other eligibility and entitlement conditions the
Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations excluding any defined "class
of persons" from eligibility.55 The only specific provisions having to do with eligibility
and entitlement are for exceptional categories. Thus, the Act retains a purely discre-
tionary power to grant benefits by order in council in "exceptional circumstances" to
otherwise ineligible persons.56 This power has been used in the past where the technical
application of rules rendered a person ineligible despite extreme need, but has been little
used in recent years. "Foster child" allowance under the FB and GWprograms are replaced
by a "child in temporary care" allowance.57 The specific conditions of eligibility under
this new program are mostly left to regulation and no details of the program are yet
'Reform' and the Revolving Door (November 1997); Hartung & Washburn, "Lockheed Martin:
From Warfare to Welfare", The Nation (2 March 1998).
52. Similar criticisms have been made in Canada. For example, the New Brunswick Provincial Auditor
strongly criticized a N.B. Human Resources Development contract with Andersen Consulting: New
Brunswick, Report of the Auditor General: Fiscal Year Ended 31 March 1995, 9-12.
53. Social Service Privatization, supra, n.50.
54. The "Who Does What" panel explicitly recommended that while delivery responsibilities should
remain with municipalities, "the authority to contract out if provincial requirements are not met,
would encourage more efficient and cost-effective services"; see Recommendations of the Social Ser-
vices Sub-panel, supra, n.33.
55. OWAs. 74() 11.
56. OWA s. 11.
57. OWA s. 10.
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available. Eligibility conditions for teenagers, already extremely restrictive, have been
made even more so. (Teens are of course a favourite political target of the Tories, who
have consistently exploited moral panic over teenage behaviour on issues from welfare
to "boot camps" for young offenders, and teen welfare has for years been a political
flashpoint.58) No one under eighteen may receive benefits except through an adult
third party; nor can the appointment of a "guardian" be appealed. 59 Whether the
exclusion would survive constitutional challenge remains to be seen.60
The Act is also silent on benefit unit issues (the meaning of "spouse", the meaning of
"dependent child", etc.). Some of these were dealt with in previous legislation,
although some of the most important issues in this area, such as the definition of
"spouse", have never been in legislation and have always been dealt with by regula-
tion. One definition that was formerly in legislation, that of "dependent child", will
be removed, allowing the government to overturn SARB and Divisional Court
decisions which held that more than one person could be the parent of a single
"dependent child" in joint custody situations, a result that the Ministry never ac-
cepted.61
b. Benefit payment and recovery
The OWA also says little about benefits. The overall benefit structure will remain
similar to the previous system. There will be additional benefits, some in the nature
of employment supports and others to replace the special assistance and supplemen-
tary aid programs under the GWA. 62 The details of these benefits will depend on the
regulations. All details of financial testing also remain in the regulations, although the
58. See M. Philp, "Teen-agers a prime target for Harris assistance cuts" The Globe and Mail (14 July
1995); A.Tomec, "Soft Landing: Teens and Ontario's Social Safety Net" [Four part series June 13,
14, 15, 16, 1994] The Sault Star; and see R. Ellsworth et al, "Poverty Law In Ontario: The Year in
Review" (1994), 10J.L.& Social Pol'y 1, at 17 n.57.
59. OWA s.17(2); 26(2)5. Despite the hysterical tenor of much public discussion of this issue, few people
under eighteen receive welfare in Ontario. At the peak of the recession there were only about 8000
16 & 17 year olds on welfare in the province. By 1995 the numbers had dropped to about 4000.
Severe eligibility restrictions were introduced in 1995 (O.Reg. 420/95) and numbers appear to have
dropped further since then, although current statistics are not available.
60. A much less restrictive rule was found by the SARB to violate s.15 of the Charter of Rights: SARB
L-09-21-43B (27 May 1996).
61. See Director of Income Maintenance (Ont.) v Laurin (1995), 129 D.L.R. (4th) 439 (Div.Ct). MCSS
field workers were nevertheless instructed in unpublished policy directives that only one parent
could ever be the custodial parent of a dependent child unless directly ordered otherwise by the
SARB. The Ministry has already announced that under the OWA only one parent will be considered
the "custodial" parent of a given child, thus continuing the policy of giving no official recognition to
shared custody arrangements.
62. The GWA authorized (but did not require) municipalities to provide a broad range of additional dis-
cretionary benefits, including dental care, eyeglasses, funeral costs, surgical supplies and dressings
and so on, to welfare recipients (special assistance), and to FB and OAS recipients (supplementary
aid): GWA ss.7(2), 13. A limited number of such benefits were made mandatory in 1991, including
diabetic supplies, surgical dressings and necessary medical transportation; see O.Reg. 546/91 ("spe-
cial necessities").
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budgetary deficit test of need is entrenched in the legislation.63 Where the OWA does
differ in important ways from the previous regime is in how benefits will be paid, and
how and when benefits will be recovered.
i) Third party payments
The OWA expands powers to deprive recipients of control over their allowances,
described in one document (in an especially Orwellian piece of doublespeak) as
"supports for achieving client self-sufficiency and discourage dependency [sic]". 64
Under s.17, an administrator may appoint a person "to act for" a recipient if the
administrator is "satisfied that the recipient is using or is likely to use his or her
assistance in a way that is not for the benefit of a member of the benefit unit." Under
s. 18, "a portion of basic financial assistance may be provided directly to a third party
on behalf of a recipient if an amount is payable by a member of the benefit unit to the
third party for costs relating to basic needs or shelter, as prescribed." The decision to
appoint an informal trustee under s.17 is appealable but section 18 decisions are not.65
Of these powers, the s. 18 power to pay directly to service providers is likely to be most
important under Ontario Works. Unlike the s.17 powers, there are no statutory
conditions for the exercise of this power and no statutory safeguards. A limited direct
payment power existed under previous legislation, 66 but its scope was unclear and
perhaps for that reason does not appear to have been much used, despite lobbying by
landlords. 67 Government statements around Bill 142 suggest strongly that s. 18 will be
used much more extensively (although there may not actually be much need for this:
the fact that workers have the power to make direct payment may be a sufficient threat
to control recipients' behaviour).
ii) Reimbursement and recovery
The OWA contains several powers to recover assistance paid out. Some of these powers
existed in previous legislation: these include the power to require an assignment of
63. OWA s.7(3)(b).
64. Blueprint, supra n.39 at 16.
65. Appointment of an informal "trustee" was originally not to be appealable. However, the right to ap-
peal, along with a power to require "trustees" to account for monies received, were added to Bill 142
before third reading.
66. The only clear authority for direct payment previously was in FBA s.5(2), which allowed for direct
payment of rent only in respect of tenants in prescribed public housing. There was no specific
authority to pay rent or other utilities under the GWA but MCSS claimed that such a power was con-
ferred by O.Reg 537 s.12(1), which refers to payments made to or "on behalf of" applicants or
recipients.
67. In 1994, as a result of a vigorous landlord lobby, a resolution sponsored by an NDP back-bencher
was passed in the Legislature calling on the government to provide for direct payment of rent; see
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard) (hereafter "Hansard') (21
April 1994). There were similar pressures on many municipal councils during this period, although
at no time in any of debates of which I am aware was there any evidence that social assistance
recipients defaulted on rental payments more than the general tenant population.
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expected income or an agreement to reimburse assistance; 68 and subrogation rights. 69
Others are new and mark sharp departures from past practices.
The Act allows liens to be placed on the homes of recipients for the first time. 70 In
debate on Bill 142 this provision was justified on the grounds that, "when assistance
... increases the value of the home over an extended period of time through the
payment of mortgage payments or emergency repairs, it makes sense to provide for
recovery". 71 In another striking departure from tradition, welfare allowances will be
garnishable in some situations. The current popular political fixation with "deadbeat"
dads is reflected in a new power to deduct from allowances amounts for family law
support orders against a member of the benefit unit.72 Child support obligations under
new federal and provincial child support guidelines begin at income levels under
which the allowance of a larger family unit would be high enough to be subject to
deductions. 73 A special irony here is that where payor and payee are both receiving
social assistance, the deductions are a pure windfall for the province, which deducts
support payments dollar for dollar from the payee's allowance as well. Finally, while
allowances are theoretically otherwise immune from private garnishment, ad-
ministrators will be able to deduct from an allowance the "prescribed government
debts owed by a member of the benefit unit".
74
68. OWA s. 13. This is similar to current regulatory assignment provisions: O.Reg. 537 s. 5. Bill 142 ini-
tially contained an open-ended power to demand reimbursement, but this was amended before third
reading. Unlike the GW provisions, however, an administrator can demand reimbursement from "a
prescribed person" in addition to an applicant, recipient or dependant.
69. OWA s. 70. This is similar although not identical to the subrogation power currently found in s.8 of
the Ministry of Community and Social Services Act. Subrogation potentially gives rise to many legal
and policy issues; see Ontario Legal Clinic Steering Committee on Social Assistance, Submission to
the Standing Committee on Social Development, Brief on Bill 142 (Clinic Resource Office, 1997)
(SCSA Brief') at 40-42, but I have been unable to find any instances in which the existing subroga-
tion powers have ever been used.
70. OWA s. 12. Property used as a principal residence has always been exempt from inclusion in count-
able assets in Ontario. Principal residences remain exempt for disabled recipients: ODSPA s. 7(3).
According to the most recently available statistics (1994), about 6% of the caseload owned their own
homes. Anecdotal reports suggest that owners are most likely to be women who have retained a
matrimonial home after separation, older people and rural residents.
71. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Hansard (2 September 1997), Debate on Bill 142, Frank Klees,
MPP. The fact that social assistance payments transfer at least a billion dollars annually to the
mortgages of private sector landlords apparently gives rise to no corresponding responsibilities.
72. OWA s.23(2). Although nominally protected from attachment or garnishment, GW and FB allowan-
ces were de facto garnished for child support where the recipient had income from another source
which was subject to child support deductions: see Wedekind v. Director of Income Maintenance
(1994), 21 O.R.(3d) 289 (C.A.); Moschella v. Peel (1996), 90 O.A.C. 174 (Div.Ct); Heyliger v.
Toronto (7 June 1996), #415/94 (Div.Ct.).
73. Family Law Act R.S.O. 1990 c.F3 as amended by Uniform Federal and Provincial Child Support
Guidelines Act, 1997 S.O. 1997 c.20. Where support for a child is "payable out of public money" a
judge cannot order support in an amount less than that provided for in the guidelines.
74. OWA s. 23(2)(b). Private garnishment or attachment of benefits is still prohibited; see s.23(l).
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iii) Overpayment recovery
The OWA contains new powers to recover overpayments, although it is silent on
the very important question of which overpayments will be recovered.75 Overpay-
ments will still be recovered by deductions from the allowances of recipients, but
administrators may now also serve former recipients with a notice of overpayment
which, unless appealed, will be enforceable as a court order.76 (The power to sue to
recover overpayments remains but is unlikely to be used often in light of the notice
power.)
A troubling aspect of the new overpayment recovery provisions is the power to recover
overpayments from a "dependent spouse". A spouse can be served with a notice of
overpayment, enforceable like a regular overpayment notice. 77 In practice, this will
primarily affect women. Although the definition of "head of household" is gender
neutral, administration of the definition is anything but; men are almost always
assumed to be the "head of household" for welfare purposes.78 Without regulations or
policies it is not known whether spousal recovery will be prohibited where the woman
did not know of, or had no control over, the creation of the overpayment. 79 Moreover,
a woman who has left an abusive relationship could be exposed to physical danger if
she tries to exercise her appeal rights under this scheme.
iv) Pursuing other resources
A general principle of social assistance administration is that claimants must avail
themselves of all other financial resources. While this covers many potential situa-
tions, by far the most important in program terms is child and spousal support. Child
and spousal support are of course very high profile issues on the social policy agenda.
Social assistance usually gets little attention in this context except insofar as public
costs of unpaid support are almost always included as arguments for increased support
enforcement. The assumption that all women have an equal interest in getting the
75. As matter of policy, the FB and GW programs do not collect "administrative error" overpayments,
but this policy has never been given explicit legislative status. It has been suggested informally that
this policy will be abolished under the OWA, but no formal announcement has been made. As the
power to recover overpayments is still framed in discretionary language in the OWA, the legal
authority for an administrative error policy will still exist.
76. If the recipient appeals the overpayment, the spouse must join the appeal as a party and cannot ap-
peal independently; see OWA s. 21.
77. OWA s.19(3); s. 21 (4),(5); s. 28(6),(7).
78. Men are recorded as "head of household" in the great majority of couples receiving assistance; see
M. Ornstein, A Profile of Social Assistance Recipients In Ontario (Toronto: York University, In-
stitute for Social Research, 1995) 10. That welfare workers assume that men are the "heads" of
families applying for assistance is also affirmed by advocates with long experience with the system.
The Ontario Ombudsman has also criticized this practice, but MCSS has consistently defended it; see
Ontario, Standing Committee on the Ombudsman, Hansard (4 December 1996) B-53 to B-63.
79. Social assistance authorities often demand overpayment recovery from women incurred in situations
of abuse and violence. Fraud charges have been laid in situations of unreported cohabitation even
though caseworkers were aware of the abuse: e.g., see R. v. Lalonde (1995), 22 O.R.(3d) 275
(Gen.Div.). There does not appear to be a consistent provincial policy on such cases.
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maximum support possible is rarely questioned.80 However, the support regime has an
important impact on recipient's lives as a site of moral scrutiny and regulation. 81 Because
support income is deducted dollar for dollar from allowances, women receive no imme-
diate financial benefit from any support obtained, while the personal, emotional, financial
and often personal safety cost of support pursuit may be substantial and many are reluctant
to pursue support. Thus, while many recipients do not object to pursuing support, the
support regime is an inherently coercive one, aimed at ensuring that women seek the
maximum support possible regardless of their own wishes.
The OWA says little directly about support, but several provisions will affect the support
regime. The Act establishes the "family support worker" (FSW) as a statutory position
for the first time.82 FSWs will have powers prescribed by regulation, including powers to
collect and disclose personal information in support proceedings and in the enforcement
of support orders. In a change which could have serious consequences in this context, it
will be an offence to obstruct or give false information to an FSW.83 In other provisions,
applicants and recipients may now also be obliged to provide information about third
parties as a condition of eligibility,84 a power presumably also intended for use in this
context.
5. Workfare
We should prepare welfare recipients to return to the workforce by
requiring all able-bodied recipients-with the exception of single
parents with young children-either to work, or to be retrained in
return for their benefits. [Emphasis in original]
The Common Sense Revolution
"Workfare" was perhaps the single most important plank in the Tory welfare platform
during the 1995 election campaign. Even the name of the new legislation is taken from
the name adopted for the "new" workfare program, Ontario Works. Although the Act itself
has relatively little to say about workfare (or employment programs generally), there is
little doubt that workfare will be a centre of political, social policy and legal controversy
for a long time.
a. Ontario Works early implementation
"Workfare" implementation started in the GW program well before enactment of the
OWA. In June 1996 the province announced "Ontario Works" pilot projects in twenty
80. Some scholars are more critical of government's interests in support enforcement, noting that "dead-
beat dad" campaigns are simply another commitment to the enforcement of private male respon-
sibility within the model of the patriarchal nuclear family; e.g., see J. Pulkingham, "Investigating the
Financial Circumstances of Separated and Divorced Parents: Implications for Family Law Reform"
(1995), 31 Can. Public Policy 1.
81. E.g., see M. Little, "Manhunts and Bingo Blabs: The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers" (1994),
19 Cdn. J.of Sociology 233.
82. OWA s.59.
83. See section 6.a.iii of this article, below.
84. See section 6.d of this article, below.
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municipalities. GW Regulations were amended in September 1996 to provide a legal
framework for the new program.8 5 Although no regulations or policies have been
released under the OWA, the existing programs will be continued under the OWA,
presumably with only minor variations at first, and thus offer some basis for comment
at this point.
Ontario Works implementation has been far from smooth. None of the initial pilot sites
made the original deadline for start-up. By the end of 1996, only half the pilot sites
were operating.8 6 Even at the time of writing full implementation of the initial phase
is not complete. The program as finally introduced does not much resemble the
Common Sense Revolution promise. Ontario Works programs must have three com-
ponents: Employment Support, Employment Placement and Community Participa-
tion. Only the latter, Community Placement, involves "workfare" in the common
public understanding of unpaid work in return for welfare. Employment Support is
not a program stream but a collection of financial supports and activities which can
include "basic education and job specific skills training" but which will primarily
provide supports to job search activities. Employment Placement is the program
component aimed at placing "job ready" recipients in unsubsidized private sectorjobs.
Most of these activities and program components are not in fact new. When examined
from the perspective of what people will actually be doing under Ontario Works, the
new program differs much less than might be thought from the former system.
"Employable" welfare recipients have always been required to look for employment
and to take any employment of which they are physically capable;87 it is clear that this
is what most people will still be doing under Ontario Works. Most municipalities in
the past have offered various kinds of assistance with job searching to some recipients;
this assistance will now be funded under Ontario Works but it is not clear that there
will be more real assistance than there was before. Education and training options have
actually been substantially restricted under Ontario Works; welfare support for post-
secondary education was abolished in 1996 and any education and training approved
under Ontario Works must be short term and directed only at the fastest possible entry
to the labour market. Despite the Common Sense Revolution election promise, educa-
tion and training are not mandatory activities under Ontario Works rules (a moot point
in any event, given that the system cannot meet even a fraction of the demand for
training spots now). Even Employment Placement is not really a new idea. Most
municipalities in the past had a "job developer" function; the main difference under
85. O.Reg,383/96, amending O.Reg.537. The regulatory framework for Ontario Works under the GW
Regulations is quite skeletal. Most program details are contained in two main MCSS policy direc-
tives, Program Guidelines for Early Implementation of Ontario Works (August 1996) ("Program
Guidelines') and Guidelines for the Development of Business Plans for Early Implementation of On-
tario Works (August 1996) ("Business Plan Guidelines").
86. "Confusion Reigns over Workfare", Workfare Watch Bulletin Vo. I No.3 (Toronto: December 1996).
87. O.Reg. 537 s.4.1 provides that an applicant, recipient or dependent adult must make "reasonable ef-
forts" to procure "any full-time, part-time or casual employment for which he or she is physically
capable".
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Ontario Works is that this function must be tendered outside the social service
administration on a fee-for-placement basis. 88 The only part of the program that is
truly "new" is Community Participation. As currently envisaged, Community Par-
ticipation involves requiring recipients to take placements either in municipal works
projects or in the voluntary (not-for-profit) sector for up to seventy hours per month.8 9
The positions are unpaid and although the program is defended in part as offering
recipients training and work experience, Community Participation is distinct from
skills training and education programs which are offered as "Employment Supports".
Ironically, given the enormous controversy that workfare has stimulated, it seems
likely that only a small percentage of the caseload will ever actually be involved in
traditional workfare. 90
Ontario Works does purport to change the orientation of employment activities. All
activities must be directed at the fastest possible route to labour market entry or
reentry.91 Applicants will be exhorted from the first contact with the system to take
responsibility for becoming self-reliant. Employment plans are to be reflected in a
contract, the "participation agreement", a sort of exercise in confession and penance
between worker and applicant. The role of the worker will be "to communicate belief
in the ability of participants to be responsible and self-reliant; and high expectations
and optimism about participants' potential to work and become independent". 92 Where
moral exhortation fails, severe sanctions for non-compliance apply.93 This then is the
state of the program as the OWA comes into force.
88. Business Plan Guidelines 25, 37-43. Early reports from Ontario Works pilot sites suggest that this
program is in serious trouble, as few agencies are willing or able to take on the tremendous risk of
employment placement where they will only be remunerated upon successful placement.
89. Some municipalities did offer voluntary unpaid work experience programs before Ontario Works
The most ambitious of these was the Metropolitan Toronto "Job Incentive Program", a voluntary
work-experience program which placed recipients in the not-for-profit sector and offered certain
financial supports. While the program did have critics, it was very popular and ended up with twice
as many people as originally anticipated, reflecting strong interest on the part of recipients: see
Metropolitan Toronto, Commissioner of Social Services, Job Incentive Project Final Report (11
December 1995).
90. A review of available Ontario Works Business Plans suggests that most municipalities project that
10% to 15% of their caseloads will take part in Community Participation. Some municipalities tried
for purely notional participation (Metro Toronto's initial goal being about 2% of the caseload) but
had to raise their goals at the insistence of the province. As discussed below, many municipalities are
not even meeting these targets. Many municipalities hope to achieve their community participation
goals by allowing recipients to count volunteer positions they have located themselves (a permissible
option under current policies).
91. Program Guidelines 4-6, 14-15.
92. Business Plan Guidelines at 32.
93. Current sanctions are three months disentitlement for the first act of non-compliance and six months
for a second or subsequent offence: O.Reg.537 s.4.3(7).
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b. Workfare under the OWA
The program described above will continue under the OWA. While there may some
changes, the overall program design has been written into the Act so radical change
is unlikely in the immediate future. However, while the program components may not
change, other changes to the welfare system do have very important implications for
employment programs. As I have already discussed, the Ontario Works caseload will
increasingly be made up of single mothers, older people and people with medical
conditions and other problems that fall short of officially recognized disability. As the
most readily employable people leave the system, the people left subject to participa-
tion requirements will increasingly be those with multiple barriers to employment who
require costly and labour intensive supports and interventions to have any realistic
hope of entering thejob market. 94 A strong case can also be made that the other changes
that have been made to the welfare system, which have greatly increased the insecurity,
health status and social isolation of thousands of recipients, will decrease rather than
increase employability.95
This has implications throughout the program: it will affect the numbers of people
seeking exemptions, deferrals and activity restrictions; it will mean increased demands
for employment supports; and so on. Whether the government will recognize and fund
this or whether it will simply put intense pressures on delivery agents to keep reducing
caseloads at all costs remains to be seen. Unfortunately, to date all evidence suggest
the latter response. Ontario Works is poorly funded and there has been no suggestion
yet that savings from reduced caseloads will be put into program supports. 96
As with much else, the Act is more notable for what it does not say about employment
programs and workfare than what it does. There are a number of enabling and
definitional provisions dealing with the components of the program but only one
section dealing directly with obligations, s. 7(4):
A recipient and any prescribed dependants may be required as a condition of
eligibility for basic financial assistance to,
(a) satisfy community participation requirements;
(b) participate in employment measures;
94. Although, as discussed above, a serious economic downturn could send large numbers of more
employable back into the welfare system and change this dynamic again.
95. I. Morrison, Ontario's Welfare Rate Cuts: An Anniversary Report, supra n.18. Many of the conse-
quences of the rate cuts can seriously affect the ability to participate in employment measures. These
include the sharp increases in homelessness or near-homelessness, sharp increases reported in the
numbers of recipients who no longer have telephones, the worsening health situation of many
recipients because of inadequate diets and cuts to related services such as dental care, all of which
mean increasing social isolation for many recipients.
96. A. Mitchell, Workfare: What we know, Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, Social In-
fopac Vol. 14. No. 4, (May 1996); M. Philp, "Workfare quotas penalize success, civic officials say"
The Globe and Mail (23 March 1998) A2.
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(c) accept and undertake basic education and job specific skills training; and
(d) accept and maintain employment.
While the Act may say little, however, the legal and policy issues raised are complex.
i) Participation standards
A major concern with the Act is the lack of legislated standards against which a refusal
or failure to comply with the program can be measured. The government refused to
consider including in the Act a "reasonable cause" standard for failure or refusal to
comply with an employment requirement. 97 Issues of exemptions, participation
restrictions and so on are important under any circumstances but will become increas-
ingly so in this scenario. Some participation standards will be set out in regulation and
policy: current Ontario Works policies do in fact make extensive provision for
exemptions, participation restrictions and excuses for non-compliance, as must any
program of this sort,98 but these can be abrogated at any time without remedy in the
absence of a legislated standard.
There is also cause for concern about how any standards, legislated or otherwise, will
be applied in practice. Miscommunications, cultural misunderstandings, undiagnosed
or disbelieved medical or psychological conditions, language or perceptual barriers
and simple bureaucratic bungling can never be entirely avoided in welfare administra-
tion. Evidence from U.S. workfare programs show that error rates in sanctions can be
very high.99 These problems have always existed in the Ontario welfare system, as
they do in all welfare systems. They may well become worse under Ontario Works,
due both to the fact that the conditionality rules have become much more complicated,
and to the characteristics of the caseload to whom the rules will apply.'oo These
concerns raise the further issue of how well the OWA review and appeals processes
can be expected to deal with such cases, a concern I address separately below.
ii) Participation supports
The Act contemplates the provision of "employment assistance" (defined to include
community participation, job search support, education and job specific skills training
and employment placement), but imposes no obligation to provide any supports. 101
97. Ontario, Standing Committee on Social Development, Hansard, (3 November 1997).
98. Program Guidelines, Chapters VI, VIII.
99. See CLASP Update (Washington: Centre for Law and Social Policy, 25 November 1997) at 7-13,
"Sanctions and Appeals". In a comparison of several jurisdictions, the reversal rates upon appeal for
sanctions range from 44% to 98%. Clients' participation barriers often went unnoticed or were
misinterpreted; an internal caseload review in one jurisdiction estimated that 50% of those sanc-
tioned should not have been.
100. In the first appeal decision under the GWA Ontario Works program, the SARB found that the welfare
office in the case had ignored every one of the procedural safeguards supposedly assured under the
program and had in fact even tried to sanction the appellant for something that was not sanctionable
under the rules; see SARB Q-09-02-40 (1997; McKean).
101. OWA ss. 3,4,6.
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Refusal to provide needed supports-child care, transportation, essential equipment,
etc.-is not appealable. 0 2 The initial funding levels for employment supports are very
low, which means that problems are likely to arise in this regard. However, even if
employment assistance is both generous and appropriate, the increasing trend towards
targetting assistance to people on the basis of their status as welfare recipients rather
than need is worrisome. In the U.S. one effect of intensive concentration of subsidized
child care, training priorities and transportation subsidies on welfare recipients is a
growing resentment by the working poor competing for the same low wage and entry
level jobs.103 The same can be expected under Ontario Works; for example, to the
extent that single mothers in workfare get priority access to existing child care spaces
or separate child care funding, they may be seen as getting special treatment by
thousands of other low income parents on waiting lists for subsidized child care spaces.
iii) Workplace rights
Another important issue is the degree to which Community Participation participants
will be treated as "workers". The status of "workfare participant"-neither
"employees" nor "volunteers" in the usual sense-is a novel one in Canadian law.
Inevitably, some day a workfare participant will be seriously injured or will injure
someone else, will be harassed or will harass someone else. When this happens, a host
of new and difficult questions will emerge.10 4 In the U.S., the assignment of untrained
and unequipped welfare recipients to dangerous and unsanitary work has become one
of the most important legal issues in respect of workfare programs and has led to a
growing number of litigation challenges.
A section excluding Community Participation participants from "any Act or regulation
that has provisions regulating employment or employees, except as prescribed" was
dropped from Bill 142 due to an embarassing bungle during Committee hearings.
However, the government has already stated that the OWA will be amended to restore
this section as soon as possible. 05 The government's stated intention is that Com-
munity Participation participants will be entitled to workers compensation benefits
(now the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997) and are partially covered by the
102. It may be possible to appeal the lack of necessary supports indirectly. This could happen if a
recipient refuses to participate in a particular activity without supports she considers necessary, is
sanctioned and appeals the sanction. In such a case the lack of supports might provide a defence to
the sanction, but it seems clear so far that the appeals tribunal under the OWA will not have the
power to order the supports to be provided. However, this issue will not be clear until regulations are
made with respect to the obligation to provide supports and clarifying the appeals provisions.
103. E.g, see M. Healy, "Reform is Pitting Working Poor Against Welfare Poor" Los Angeles Times (19
February 1998) [from AP line feed].
104. See S. McCrossin, "Workfare or Workhouse? Occupational Health and Safety and 'Ontario Works"'
(1997), 12 J. L.& Social Pol'y 140 for a review of some of these issues under the GWA (the legal
situation may change somewhat when the OWA comes into effect).
105. Pending proclamation of the OWA, a similar provision of the GWA, s.15.1, governs workfare place-
ments. Regulations under that section came into effect January 1, 1998: O.Reg. 537 s.32, as amended
by O.Reg 487/87.
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Occupational Health and Safety Act, but will be excluded from the Employment
Standards Act.1 06 There is some question as to whether participants are protected under
the Ontario Human Rights Code, although it does not seem to have been the
government's intention to exclude them. 107
iv) Women and workfare
One of the most fundamental social policy shifts in Ontario Works is the redefining
of women with children as "workers" rather than "mothers". 108 For the first time,
mothers of children of "school age" will be subject to mandatory employment
requirements. 109 However, some of the most important policy issues flowing from this
shift are strikingly absent from both public discussion and the program itself. The issue
of childcare has of course been a focal point of criticism of the workfare proposal from
the outset, but this is only one of many concerns about the inclusion of single mothers
in mandatory employment programs.
The issue of domestic violence in particular should be noted. There has been almost
no discussion of this issue in relation to Ontario Works. Evidence from U.S.workfare
programs suggests a high incidence of domestic violence, either past or current,
amongst participants,' 10 with consequences that include serious mental health
problems relating to post-traumatic stress disorder, mental health and behavioural
problems in dependent children exposed to abuse, stalking and threats from former
partners, and participation problems stemming from current abuse. Indeed, it is
probable that the high rates of depression and other mental health problems commonly
found amongst single parents on social assistance are related to similar experiences
of domestic violence.1 11
106. Ibid.
107. The Code affords "employees" protections against discrimination, including sexual and other harass-
ment: Human Rights Code R.S.O 1990 c.H-19, s.5. If this is interpreted as being legislation "regulat-
ing employment or employees", it might be argued that GWA s.15.1 and any successor amendments
to the OWA exclude it. However, this appears to have been an oversight. The Ontario Works policy
guidelines seem to assume that the Code will apply to Community Participation.
108. See above n.24.
109. The OWA does not specify when these requirements will commence. At the time of writing, it ap-
pears that the government intends to impose mandatory requirements on all sole support parents
whose youngest child is old enough to attend full-time school. However, in some jurisdictions the
age for commencement of mandatory requirements is much younger, and the relevant age could be
changed by regulation in the future.
110. There is a rapidly growing body of U.S. research into this issue; e.g., see J. Raphael, Trapped by
Poverty/Trapped by Abuse: New Evidence Documenting the Relationship Between Domestic
Violence and Welfare, (University of Michigan School of Social Work, 1997); M.Allard et al., In
Harm's Way? Domestic Violence, AFDC Receipt and Welfare Reform in Massachusetts (Boston:
University of Massachussetts, 1997); W. Pollack, "Twice Victimized-Domestic Violence and Wel-
fare 'Reform"' (1996: Special Issue) Clearinghouse Review 329; see also Women and Workfare,
Workfare Watch Special Edition (Toronto: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto,
December 1997).
111. Ornstein's large scale 1995 study of social assistance recipients concluded that the psychological
(1998) 13 Journal of Law and Social Policy
All evidence suggests that most single parents make extensive and sustained efforts
to leave social assistance, as do the great majority of all welfare recipients. 112
However, single parents face particularly severe barriers to sustained independence
through paid employment. By reducing access to training and higher education and
by insisting that the dominant goal for all recipients is immediate labour market entry
no matter how poorly paid or precarious the employment, Ontario Works employment
programs will do little to address these problems. Moreover, Ontario Works will
almost certainly dramatically increase the time needed by single parents to negotiate
the bureaucratic demands of the system, not just for participation in mandatory
activities but to comply with ever increasing eligibility verification requirements.
Since almost all of the strategies for surviving on welfare level incomes demand time
(visiting food banks, bargain hunting, seeking occasional cash employment) in addi-
tion to that required by parenting alone, the stresses on single parents will continue to
increase. In short, Ontario Works might succeed in forcing some single parents off the
welfare rolls; but there seems little chance that it will improve the economic status of
very many.
c. Future directions
Few Tory welfare promises seemed to make more "common sense" than that people
who receive welfare should work for their benefits. The proposition was vague enough
to serve both as a focal point for hostility towards recipients and as a promise of a
"hand up", depending on how it was presented. Indeed, many recipients themselves
"voted for workfare". However, the generality of the promise obscured the fact that
the Tories had no clear idea of how they would carry it out. As then-candidate Harris
said in the spring of 1995, "government is trying to 'overthink' the problem [of
work-to-welfare]. The solution may be much more community-based than previously
thought, with much less bureacracy and far lower costs". 113 In fact, it seems that the
government rather seriously "underthought" its promises and continues to confront
problems with them.
The central problem in the government's workfare program is, not suprisingly,
workfare itself, or Community Participation. The simplistic promise of mandatory
workfare which led to such political success has become the major barrier to Ontario
Works. The initial idea that the non-profit voluntary sector would become a placement
site for large numbers of workfare placements has been a major failure; in general, the
situation of social assistance recipients was "dramatically worse" than that of the general population;
see Ornstein, supra, n.78 at 89. One Ontario study of single mothers on social assistance found that
45% of the study group suffered from a depressive condition severe enough to seriously interfere
with any training or work program if not treated; see C. Byrne et al., 12 month prevalence rates of
depression in sole support parents receiving social assistance; prevalence rates of depression in
their children Paper 96-3, Interim Report for When the Bough Breaks and Benefitting the
Beneficiaries of SocialAssistance (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1996).
112. I. Morrison, Workfare for Whom? Social Assistance Recipients and Labour Force Participation,
Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, Social Infopac Vol. 14, No. 3 (1996).
113. "Welfare should be a hand-up", supra n. 1.
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voluntary sector has been very hesitant to become involved in workfare.1 14 Many
municipalities (including Toronto) strongly resisted mandatory workfare from the
outset and came to participate only reluctantly and under threat of serious financial
sanctions. Many municipalities have not met their Community Participation targets
and are becoming increasingly critical of the program. Toronto has openly criticized
Community Participation as counterproductive; arguing that it is actually preventing
the municipality from directing resources towards more successful welfare-to-work
measures.115 First Nations, who deliver welfare separately on reserves, are also in a
confrontational situation over workfare in areas of Band administration.
116
This has left the government with a surprisingly difficult problem. Public support for
workfare is high but uninformed and generally diffuse. Opposition is much more
limited, but concentrated amongst people and organizational structures, like municipal
social service administrations and the voluntary sector, whose participation is politi-
cally important. The government's own shaky political rationale for off-loading social
responsibilities to municipalities and to private charity rests in part on the claim that
"expertise" resides in sites closest to those in need. Resistance from these sites
therefore poses a serious dilemma, especially as the government either will not, or
politically cannot, back off from its insistence on the "mandatory" nature of workfare.
The problems may well get worse as full-scale implementation proceeds. As discussed
above, Ontario Works programs are likely to be dealing increasingly with a hard-to-
serve caseload as time goes by. There is little chance that the province will ever be
able to make a case that Ontario Works "works", at least not one that would withstand
careful scrutiny. The fundamental problem is that most programs like Ontario Works
show no demonstrable benefits to recipients at all: they do not significantly improve
earnings, reduce welfare rolls or usage or reduce poverty. Some actually leave
participants worse off than comparable control groups. The few programs that do show
positive outcomes for recipients involve conditions that do not pertain in Ontario:
intensive and expensive investment in "human capital", very low unemployment, or
both. Often, the only savings from mandatory employment activities come from
sanctions.11 7 To date, no plans for any methodologically rigorous evaluations of
114. There are many reasons for this: many agencies and organizations are strongly opposed on principle
to workfare: some refuse to coooperate with a government that they perceive as deliberately brutaliz-
ing the poor, some have probably been deterred by threats from organized labour to retaliate against
major funders such as the United Way if they cooperate with workfare; many would happily take
part in a voluntary program but are not willing to be responsible for sanctioning; while for many the
bureaucratic demands of the program simply make it not worthwhile for them. While the picture
varies around the province, most municipalities report little interest from the voluntary sector when
approached about participation.
115. See M. Philp, "Workfare quotas penalize success, civic officials say", supra n.96.
116. "Ontario Indians Seeking Workfare Option", The Toronto Star (2 February 1998) A7 (CP).
117. Welfare-to-work programs have been extensively studied in the U.S. in situations where program
participation outcomes have been measured against control groups to allow for reasonably accurate
assessments of what results can actually be attributed to the program; see A. Mitchell, Workfare:
(1998) 13 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Ontario Works have been announced. The government specifically refused to include
in the OWA provisions requiring evaluation or assessment, although such provisions
do exist in other social welfare legislation. 118 Instead, it has relied on public relations
strategies ranging from obfuscation of the actual extent of the program to a $900,000
"information" campaign, launched in October 1997, extolling OntarioWorks. Never-
theless, there is a real political risk in the program.
For these reasons, the future directions of the program are very unclear. The govern-
ment has essentially three options. The first is to leave Community Participation as a
more or less token activity within Ontario Works but continue an aggressive public
relations campaign to obscure this. The second is to greatly expand placements into
the public sector, following a pattern in the U.S., where tens of thousands of municipal
employees have been displaced by workfare placements. 119 The third option-now
being discussed openly-is to expand the program into the private sector using welfare
as a wage subsidy to private sector employers. 120 Obviously the direction that is chosen
will have profound implications for the future employment programming and ex-
periences under Ontario Works.
6. Eligibility Verification And Fraud Control
Every penny that is paid to the wrong person through mistake or fraud is food taken
from the needy. Fraud and overpayments must be stopped. 121
[I]n North America, workfare does not proceed in isolation, but exists as part of a
wider campaign of suspicion and punitive administrative practices directed against
those on welfare including cutbacks in benefits, the creation of fraud squads and
frequent home visiting to detect concealed income.... In practice, [workfare's] im-
plementation is part of the cultivation of a wider climate of suspicion and stig-
matization of welfare clients. 122
"Getting tough on fraud" is the stock in trade of welfare politics. Claims of rampant
fraud and abuse against alleged NDP mismanagement of the social assistance system
were frequently made by the Tories in opposition. A drive towards tightening eligibility
requirements and verification has been evident in the Ontario welfare system for
several years, beginning with the "enhanced verification" initiative in 1992-93.
Eligibility investigations intensified sharply in FB and welfare offices immediately
What We Know, supra n.96.
118. For example, s.3 of the Employment Insurance Act S.C. 1996, c.23, provides that the Employment
Commission must monitor and assess the effectiveness and impact of the Act and report to Parlia-
ment regularly.
119. Workfare Watch Vol. 1, No.4 (March 1997).
120. R. Mackie, "Workfare could be expanded to private sector" The Globe and Mail (9 February 1998)
A6.
121. Common Sense Revolution, 10.
122. J. Struthers, Can Workfare Work? Reflections From History, supra, n.15 at 7.
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after the 1995 election. The themes of stricter eligibility controls and aggressive
pursuit of fraud run throughout the OWA, from information demands, to "fraud units",
to expanded information sharing practices to new offence provisions.
The concern that welfare might go to someone other than the "truly needy" has
dominated social assistance programs for as long as they have existed. It is important
to note that the debate here is about far more than welfare "fraud" in any technical
legal sense. Fraud rhetoric in public and political discourse is only loosely related to
legality; rather, the phrase "fraud and abuse" encompasses a continuum from actual
criminal behaviour to activities which are legal but morally disapproved for whatever
reason. The value of the rhetoric in conservative anti-welfare campaigns is obvious;
fraud discourse subverts claims of need not by confronting or denying them directly,
but by side-stepping them. "Fraud talk" helps construct a generalized atmosphere of
oppression and fear which constitutes much of the lived experience of poverty. It
fragments and mutes opposition even amongst those who are oppressed by it.
Invoking the "truly needy" patently has nothing to do with need in any meaningful
sense. In the vast majority of instances in which people violate technical rules,
knowingly or otherwise, they remain very poor. Very few such cases involve
significant amounts of money. Rather, the use of the phrase is a further code that
allows for the stigmatization of those who "break the rules" while the near-impos-
sibility of keeping the rules means that justifications for further disciplinary actions
against recipients will always reinvent themselves. There is very little evidence of
serious criminal activity solely for gain in welfare programs; on the other hand,
many, probably most, recipients rely on additional cash and other supports. 123
Whether the strategies they use to supplement welfare incomes are "legal" depends
on a mass of vague and constantly changing rules and as often as not, the whims
of caseworkers (nor do all rule violations, deliberate or otherwise, necessarily
mean any economic loss to the welfare system). As Hartley Dean and Margaret
Melrose argue:
Benefit fraud ... does not necessarily represent a failure of the social security sys-
tem. It could also represent a manageable kind of discord; a symbolically significant
component to the strategic orchestration of discipline in an increasingly polarized
society.124
The OWA provisions dealing with eligibility verification and investigations constitute
an enormous extension of the system's powers over all individuals. Welfare ad-
ministration under the OWA may or may not uncover or deter significant hitherto
undiscovered levels of illegal conduct (while the government will almost certainly
123. One recent U.S. study discovered that almost all AFDC single mothers interviewed depended on un-
reported income or support in kind. They were, nevertheless, poor---the additional income was a sur-
vival strategy: K.Edin & L.Lein, Making Ends Meet. How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and
Low-Wage Work (New York: Russell-Sage Foundation, 1997).
124. H. Dean & M. Melrose, "Manageable Discord", [http://snipe.ukc.ac.uk/ESRC/papers/dean/dean-
cour.html] at 9.
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make these claims it is almost as certain that any such claims will be unverifiable),
but it will certainly confer new powers to refuse, delay or terminate assistance on
bureaucratic grounds and to maintain an even greater degree of surveillance and
scrutiny over applicants and recipients.
a. Information Demands and Eligibility Verification
The complexity of welfare programs means that there is a virtually endless list of
matters about which information demands can be made. This has long been a source
of complaint. Caseworkers' discretion over information demands can be used to delay
applications or to harass unpopular clients. The legislative basis for increasing infor-
mation demands from applicants and recipients is arguably one of the most important
areas of change in the OWA.
Section 7(3) provides that no person is eligible for assistance unless the person (and
any prescribed dependants) provide "the information and the verification of informa-
tion required to determine eligibility". Regulations will prescribe what information is
to be provided, when and how it is to be provided and when "home visits" are
required. 125 People may be required to provide information "including encrypted
biometric information" and "personal information about a third party that is relevant
to determining the person's eligibility". 126
i) Information and verification
There is a crucial difference between the power to demand information necessary to
determine eligibility (the former rule) and the new power to prescribe what is
acceptable "verification". Some forms of information which are commonly demanded
are far beyond recipients' financial capacity to obtain. 127 People without housing or
in dangerous or insecure housing often lose important documentation or have it stolen.
Formerly, administrators could waive requirements or accept alternative forms of
proof. If they did not, the refusal could be appealed to the SARB. Under the OWA, not
only can specific documentation be prescribed as necessary to complete an application
or maintain eligibility, but administrators no longer have any statutory discretion to
waive or modify requirements. Obviously much will depend here on what the regula-
tions actually say, but there are no reasons to suppose that these powers will not be
used to further exclude and deter people in genuine need. The province has already
announced new information demands to be imposed under Ontario Works which will
result in people being denied assistance. 128
125. OWA s. 74(1).9 (ii).
126. OWA s. 74(3).
127. For example, welfare workers often demand bank records to "prove" that people are in fact destitute
and the power to examine financial transactions can extend backwards to three years before the ap-
plication for assistance. Production of these records often requires hours of bank time and most
banks charge an hourly rate for the service; e.g., see SARB N-06-22-21 (12 June 1995); SARB Q-
11-25-10 (1997); SARB S-04-03-17 (1997/98).
128. MCSS has already announced that under Ontario Works homeless people will only qualify for shel-
ter allowances if they can produce receipts for shelter already paid for. Most people who work with
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ii) "Biometric identification"
In practice, the power to require "biometric identifiers" means electronically encoded
fingerprints. 129 Although technically different from the physical fingerprinting used
in the criminal justice system, the distinction has generally been rejected by opponents,
who see fingerimaging as a further step in the "criminalization" of the poor 130
(although there is less evidence of widespread opposition amongst recipients general-
ly131). Criticism of the original Bill 142 proposals was so severe that the bill was
amended by third reading to impose stringent controls on the collection, storage and
use of any kind of biometric identification. 132 The debate over safeguards, however,
obscures the more fundamental question of whether any business case can actually be
made for the practice. Exorbitant claims are often made about "biometric identifica-
tion" systems but these are hard to verify. Fingerscanning can only detect or deter
'double-dipping', but there is no evidence that this is a major problem in welfare
programs. 133 The claim that fingerscanning "deters" fraud is difficult to test, to say
the least.134 Independent studies of some programs have found no savings whatever
in light of the costs of the technology. 135 Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the
the homeless have already denounced these measures as imposing an impossible burden, apparently
established only to drive one of the most vulnerable groups of recipients further into poverty.
129. Other forms of biometric identification (e.g., face imaging, retinal scanning) are sometimes proposed but
are almost always rejected as more difficult than fingerscanning. During the 1995 election campaign the
Tories promised a welfare photo-I) card, but this issue seems to have been long since dropped.
130. Ironically, this idea first arose in Metro Toronto, historically a relatively progressive delivery site: M.
Philp, "Fingerprint plan for welfare urged" The Globe and Mail (16 February 1994) Al, A6.
131. Not surprising, welfare recipients often share dominant attitudes and beliefs about fraud. Some
studies have found surprisingly strong recipient approval (or at least non-rejection) of fingerscanning
(although the accuracy of studies carried out by welfare administrations might be suspect); e.g., see
N.Y. State Department of Social Services, Office of Quality Assurance and Audit, Assessment
Report of the Automated Finger Imaging System Demonstration Project (1994); Texas Department
of Human Services, Programs Office, Process Evaluation of the Texas Lone Star Image System
(1997) (interestingly, this study found that caseworkers object to fingerscanning more than
recipients); Metropolitan Toronto, Commisioner of Social Services, Client Identification and
Benefits System Contract (24 April 1997), 9.
132. OWA ss. 75, 76. Most of the amendments were directed at deflecting criticism that fingerprints
would not be securely stored and would be shared without controls. The amendments require that
fingerprints be encrypted forthwith, that original information be destroyed, that only basic identify-
ing information be linked to the encryption and that the information must be stored in a manner from
which an original cannot be reconstructed.
133. The results of all other conventional detection mechanisms suggest that unreported income and un-
reported cohabitation are by far the most important causes of payments to ineligible persons. That
these findings are fairly accurate is suggested by the fact that in most places where fingerimaging has
been introduced, few people are caught double-dipping.
134. Vendors of the technology often cite caseload terminations of people who do not turn up to be
fingerprinted. However, unless the numerous alterriative possible explanations for this phenomenon
are investigated and discounted (failure to receive notice, incomprehension, illness, incapacity or
other personal crisis, lack of transportation, personal objection, inability to compel other required
participants to attend) these claims remain suspect.
135. Texas Department of Human Services, Programs Office, Lone Star Image System Evaluation: Final
(1998) 13 Journal of Law and Social Policy
techno-fix allure of fingerimaging will at least initially prove irresistable and will
probably even expand into other government programs. 
136
iii) Third party information requirements
The power to demand information about third parties is also troubling. It would
presumably be used to demand information about people from whom support might
be owing, such as from a former spouse or immigrant sponsor. This power would not
be needed for information already within the knowledge or control of an applicant or
recipient, so it must be assumed that it is intended to allow demands for information
that the person does not possess. Thus, s. 74(3)(b) seems to contemplate disqualifica-
tion for failure to provide information which the person may have no ability to produce,
or where even seeking the information might be dangerous, if there is a history of
abuse between the person and the third party.
b. Fraud units and snitch lines
The OWA authorizes the creation of "fraud control units" to investigate the eligibility
of past and present applicants and recipients. 137 Concerns about eligibility investiga-
tions practices and new offence provisions are discussed separately below. However,
the most visible public face of the new fraud units will likely be the province's welfare
"Hotline". The Hotline was one of the first Tory welfare initiatives, instituted on
October 2, 1995 (ironically, just as some local welfare snitch lines were being closed
around Ontario138). By October 2, 1997, MCSS was claiming that the snitch line had
saved almost $15 million over two years at a cost of approximately $348,000.139 This
claim is probably greatly exaggerated. 140 Much more striking is that the vast majority
of calls to the Hotline involve no wrongdoing or error (in fact, many people reported
to welfare snitch lines are not even on welfarel 4l). After two years, only 7.9% of calls
Report (1997), 34.
136. A January 1997 federal government report on immigration proposed that refugees and some other
immigrants might be required to carry cards with encrypted fingerprints, which one reporter mused
"could also be tied in to welfare and medicare systems to prevent double-dipping and fraud": A
Thompson, "High-tech tracking system proposed" The Toronto Star (7 January 1998).
137. OWA s.57.
138. E.g., see M. Reitsma-Street & J. Keck, 'The Abolition of a Welfare Snitch Line" (1996) 64 The So-
cial Worker 35.
139. Ontario, MCSS, SocialAssistance Fraud Control Report (13 November 1997).
140. There are several reasons for this. First, it is not clear how many cases were actually investigated as a
result of Hotline tips; apparently allegations from all sources are included in the Hotline figures; see
Social Assistance and Employment Opportunities Branch Memorandum: Welfare Fraud Control
Database, SAPB 9616 (9 October 1996) 2. We do not know, for example, how many such additional
referrals (which presumably would have occurred without the Hotline) are included in the Hotline
report; nor do we know whether they are generally more accurate than telephone reports. Second, the
"cost" figures for the line apparently exclude the costs and lost opportunity time of staff investiga-
tions. Finally, the $15 figure assumes that everyone found to be wrongfully receiving benefits would
have continued to do so and would not have been identified without the snitch line: see M. Murray,
"Ecker questioned on amount saved from fraud line" The Globe And Mail (18 December 1997) A10.
141. In Metro Toronto, typically about a quarter to a third of people reported to its fraud line annually are
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had resulted in any action. Only a miniscule percentage was referred to police; the
number prosecuted was even less. 142 On this standard, the Hotline would seem to be
an inefficient strategy, far less effective than most programs involving public reports
of alleged crimes. 143 This is of little importance, though, if the main function of snitch
lines is understood to be ideological rather than as a serious crime control measure.
Snitch lines help to construct and maintain the image of the dependent poor as "Other"
and to reinforce recipients' understanding of themselves as objects of constant sur-
veillance and public scrutiny.144 The fact that only a tiny percentage of all calls reveal
serious criminal activities is irrelevant to this end. What is more important is that all
callers to snitch lines believe that they have revealed wrongdoing 45-a belief which
they presumably share within their social communities, thus perpetuating the environ-
ment in which "fraud talk" can be politically manipulated.
c. Investigatory powers
The OWA entrenches in legislation for the first time the position of "eligibility review
officer" or "ERO". 146 EROs will be vested with "prescribed powers including the
authority to apply for and act under a search warrant". A crucially important question
is what these powers will be and how they will be used. A 1994 Tory private member's
bill, introduced in opposition and modelled on the powers of the notorious Quebec
welfare police, 147 would have given welfare investigators the power to examine any
not on welfare. In 1992, less than half those reported were on assistance: see Metropolitan Toronto,
Community Services and Housing Division Presentation, Social Assistance Caseload Charac-
teristics (23 November 1993).
142. Of 26,214 allegations over two years, 136 or 0.5% were referred to police for further investigation
and 36 were actually prosecuted. These figures are consistent with the outcomes of anti-fraud
measures in various programs across the years; fraud crackdowns virtually never result in significant
numbers of prosecutions despite governmental spins on the outcomes: I. Morrison, Welfare Reform
and Welfare Fraud: The Real Issues, Ontario Social Safety NetWork Backgrounder (Toronto: On-
tario Social Safety Network, 1997).
143. By way of comparison, in the eleven months from January 1997 to November 1997, the "Crime
Stoppers" phone lines in York Region, Metro Toronto and Peel Region received 2453 calls. These
led to 363 arrests, closure of 421 police files and 1001 charges laid. These figures do not include so-
cial welfare offence investigations, which are referred to the appropriate hotlines. (Information
provided by Constable Wayne Snooks, Coordinator of the York Region Crime Stoppers program:
telephone interview, December 1997.)
144. As one recipient put it: "I live in a place with a dreaded 'snitch line'. If you are on assistance you
know too well what 'line' I am referring to. The harmful, devastating outcome of a false report by a
neighbour is a fear I constantly live with"; Reality Cheque: Telling Our Stories of Life on Welfare in
Ontario (Toronto: Ontario Social Safety Network, 1996) 17.
145. Callers are not told (and cannot be told due to protection of privacy legislation) whether the people
they report are on welfare, let alone whether their reported "offences" are real ones.
146. OWA s. 58.
147. The Quebec government has often boasted of the "savings" through fraud detection and prevention.
However, a 1993 review of the practices of the "bou bou macoutes" at the University of Montreal
concluded that the government's claims were grossly exaggerated and full of distortions and mis-
representations; in short, that the highly publicized anti-fraud initiatives were for political ends only:
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person under oath, the power to require the production of documents or other things
and contempt powers against any person who refused to answer; it also would have
exempted any informant from confidentiality or privilege rules and would have
effectively barred civil suits against an informant for giving false or misleading
information. 1
48
That EROs might be given such extraordinary powers without any clearly
demonstrated need is problematical. Recipient and advocate complaints about abuses
of powers by EROs and other enforcement officials within the social assistance system
are ubiquitous but even harder to prove conclusively than complaints about abuses of
police powers. Some of the types of allegations constantly repeated include harass-
ment and intimidation of people, including psychologically vulnerable and develop-
mentally delayed recipients, deliberately lying or threatening fraud prosecutions to
elicit "confessions" about wrongdoing, wearing police insignia on clothing during
investigations, failing to advise people under investigation of their appeal rights and
suppressing exculpatory information during appeal proceedings. 149 To the extent that
this behaviour exists, it would strain credibility to suppose that it will receive less tacit
encouragement under Ontario Works than under previous legislation.
d. Offences and prosecutions
Both the FBA and GWA made it an offence to "knowingly obtain or receive assistance"
to which a person is not entitled. 150 The OWA retains this offence, punishable by a
maximum $5000 fine or six months imprisonment, and creates a new offence of
obstructing or knowingly giving false information to an ERO or Family Support
Worker. 151 Assistance will be denied to anyone convicted of an offence "in relation to
social assistance". 152
see J.L.Gow et al, "Choc des valeurs dans l'aide sociale au Quebec? Pertinence et signification des
visites a domicile" (Department de science politique: U. de Montreal, 1993).
148. An Act To Amend the Family Benefits Act and the General Welfare Assistance Act, (1994; Private
Members Bill, Bill 144) Gary Carr (PC, Oakville South); Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Hansard (7
April 1994) 5435-5443.
149. These are all common allegations made by advocates familiar with the social assistance system. A
few have been the subject of formal written complaints. Some examples are taken from decisions of
the Social Assistance Review Board: e.g. SARB M-12-25-25 (1996) (ERO acknowledged that she
had no evidence against appellant, but testified that "when people are told there is proof of an allega-
tion, they will sometimes admit it."); SARB L-08-09-46 (1996) (workers' notes missing from files or
subsequently altered); SARB G-1 1-03-13 (reasons for termination were "excuses invented by a wel-
fare worker" after main issue resolved). See also M. Little, "Manhunts and Bingo Blabs", supra
n.81; Ontario, Standing Committee on Social Development, Hearings into Bill 142, Hansard (20 Oc-
tober 1997), presentation on behalf of Muskoka Legal Clinic.
150. GWA s.16, FBA s.19.
151. OWA s. 79(3). Again, a common complaint against EROs has been that they frequently threaten
recipients, relatives and others with "fraud" if they do not cooperate with investigations. The ability
to threaten both recipients and third parties with "obstruction" will be a powerful incentive to expand
this practice.
152. OWA s.74(6). No ineligibility period is prescribed in the Act. The government has said that the
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The FBA and GWA offence sections were rarely if ever used in practice. Serious
allegations were referred to police and laid as fraud charges under the Criminal Code
if the evidence warranted. Other cases were treated as overpayments and recovered
from ongoing benefits or pursued through civil action. Without doubt, serious cases
will still be charged criminally. The question is what will happen with the many cases
that would formerly have been resolved administratively or civilly. Clearly there will
be strong political and financial incentives to lay more provincial charges under the
OWA. If the number of prosecutions does not increase, the government's fraud rhetoric
will look at best mistaken and at worst deliberately inflammatory. The fact that a
conviction will render a person ineligible for assistance will create a strong financial
incentive to lay charges. Provincial charges can be laid by EROs without police
involvement or screening. This is important because police are not under the direction
of MCSS or municipal welfare administrators, unlike EROs, who are also less trained
and have a greater personal stake in the outcome of investigations. Given that few
people charged under these provisions will be represented (and so will almost certainly
be convicted) the offence provisions are a potential bonanza for the system.
153
e. Freedom of information and protection of privacy
The identity of social assistance recipients is protected by legislation in Ontario,
154
but these protections mean little in practice. All applicants must sign a consent to
release information form which effectively authorizes disclosure of personal informa-
tion to any party at any time.155 The OWA also now provides expressly for a broad
spectrum of information sharing agreements within Ontario and between Ontario and
other governments without consent 156 (and the province has already negotiated several
such agreements). As a practical matter, recipients have few meaningful privacy rights
in law. Although confidentiality is often identified by recipients as extremely impor-
tant to them, almost any eligibility investigation will immediately reveal a recipient's
identity to neighbours, landlords, friends, merchants or employers. The administration
of workfare will further erode confidentiality.
penalty prescribed by regulations will be a minimum ineligibility period of three months for a first
offence and six months for a second offence.
153. Under the current rules of the Ontario legal aid system, it is very hard to get legal aid for a provincial
offence. Unrepresented accused are particularly likely to plead guilty from intimidation or despair, or
to be convicted despite a possible defence. These problems are compounded when dealing with a
complex and poorly understood program with which few criminal lawyers have much experience.
154. Information about receipt of public benefits is defined as "personal information" under both the
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act RSO 1990 c.F.31("FIPPA") and the
Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection and Privacy Act RSO 1990 c.M.56 ("MFIPPA").
Disclosure of this information is deemed to be an injustified invastion of personal privacy under both
Acts unless released for a purpose authorized therein.
155. Form 3 (a mandatory requirement in a social assistance application) authorizes disclosure "to any
party personal information about me, my spouse ... or any of my dependents or my foster children
for the purpose of determining or verifying my initial or ongoing eligibility for social assistance or
administering my social assistance".
156. OWA ss.71,72.
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Conversely, the province has already made it far more difficult for recipients (or
advocates) to get access to information about themselves, and the OWA will raise
further barriers. Recent amendments to Ontario's freedom of information legislation
have imposed new fees and administrative barriers for people seeking information
about their own files, 157 and some social assistance delivery sites have become more
and more aggressive about resisting disclosure of files even during litigation. The
OWA now provides that any ERO engaged in an eligibility investigation (regardless
of whether there are grounds to believe that an offence has occurred) or anyone
conducting a "fraud" investigation shall be deemed to be engaged in "law enforce-
ment" for the purposes of freedom of information legislation, which means that
recipients can be refused access to their own files. 15
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7. Decision Making and Due Process
a. From SARB to SOBET
[The Social Assistance Review Board] is not accountable to the public in reaching
decisions that inspire the public's confidence; it is not accountable for the funds is-
sued; and it has no directive to protect the public interest. For the Board to function
as an autonomous body without a mandate to protect the public interest has resulted
in disasterous rulings, irresponsible policies, and promiscuous expenditures.159
The OWA "reforms" to the appeals system confirm the strength of these sentiments
within social assistance administrations leading up to the introduction of Bill 142. To
understand the degree to which the OWA has changed the nature of the appeals system,
it is necessary to briefly review the history of the former appeals system, the Social
Assistance Review Board and why there has been such a vehement backlash against
it.
The appeals system is not new to controversy. In fact, it was only with some reluctance
that Ontario even implemented an appeals system at all, despite the legal obligation
to establish an independent appeals body imposed by the CAP cost sharing agreement
signed in 1967. Ontario had been opposed to this aspect of CAP and even after
legislation was passed to implement it, the province dragged its feet on the creation
of an appeals board until political pressure forced the government of the day to act.
Nor did Ontario attempt to do more than meet its minimum obligations in this area;
once established, the Social Assistance Review Board quickly became a repository of
patronage appointments and was of low profile and little significance. 160
157. Under 1996 amendments, people seeking access to information under provincial legislation must pay
a fee with each request and can be required to pay production and photocopy costs for all informa-
tion provided: SO 1996 c.1, Sch.K, amending MFIPPA.
158. OWA s. 57(4); MFIPPA s. 8, 32(0, (g).
159. E. Sabatini, Welfare-No Fair: A Critical Analysis of Ontario's Welfare System (1985-1994) (1996:
The Fraser Institute, Vancouver) at 48.
160. See J. Struthers, The Limits of Affluence, supra n.8 at 246-247.
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By the late 1970s, however, the conduct of the Board began to emerge as a legal and
political issue, as the growth of legal aid services meant increased external scrutiny
of the Board's conduct. Pressure on the appeals system mounted when the Divisional
Court, hearing statutory appeals from SARB, began to issue pointed criticisms of the
poor quality of the Board's decisions. 161 By the time of the Social Assistance Review,
the momentum for change had become overwhelming. Tribunal reform based on a
classic due process model began even before the SARC issued its final report. A new
Chair was appointed and the entire membership was replaced within one or two years.
Open hiring competitions and a rigorous selection process were introduced for the first
time in the Board's history.162 Board members were put through a lengthy training
process, new hearings policies were established and an in-house legal department was
created to advise members and (in practice) to review all decisions of the board.
The "new" SARB brought a radical change in approach to the appeals system. Many
of the new members were lawyers, paralegals or community advocates of other kinds
who had worked on behalf of recipients prior to appointment and brought sympathy
for clients and reformist sentiments to their new jobs. With increased legal knowledge
and resources, the "new" SARB decided that their institutional role required them to
interpret social assistance legislation and regulations independently of provincial or
municipal operating policies. The practical results were striking. The percentage of
appeals granted went from a fairly steady rate of just over 15% in the early 1980s to
a high of about 48% in 1989 and remained fairly high thereafter. 163 Because these
rates included appeals where the appellant did not turn up and therefore lost automat-
ically, the effective "grant" rates for contested appeals were actually much higher.
164
Not surprisingly, just as the "old" SARB had been the object of hostility by advocates
for applicants and recipients, the "new" SARB soon began to be a target of resentment
by at least some people within social assistance administrations. 165 In part this was
directed at the high reversal rates. Some people within social assistance administra-
tions accused SARB of trying to effect law reform on its own behalf. 166 "Interim
assistance" was another major problem area. Appellants were entitled to request
161. See Re Pins and Director of Family Benefits (1985), 51 O.R.(2d) 302 (Div.Ct.).
162. See S.R. Ellis "Dramatic Departures in Appointments Policies", in Administrative Law: Dramatic
Departures in a Downsizing State (Department of Continuing Legal Education, Law Society of
Upper Canada, December 1997)
163. Ontario, Social Assistance Review Board Annual Report 1992-1993 (1993) at 29.
164. There were arguably other reasons for the high reversal rates at SARB. During the early 1990s there
were a myriad of regulation and policy changes in social assistance programs (often with little or no
warning to caseworkers or training) at the same time that worker/client ratios were deteriorating due
to caseload increases. This obviously affected the accuracy of front-line decision making, but the
Board reforms were still clearly the most important factor here.
165. Sabatini, supra n.159.
166. Ibid. This concern was also expressed to me as a member of the Legal Issues Project Team of the
New Legislation Development Project during the NDP administration in the early 1990s.
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interim assistance pending appeals, which was in theory to be awarded solely on the
basis of financial need. 167 The power to provide interim assistance led to an ines-
capable dilemma. Many issues were effectively rendered moot because an appellant
might receive several months of interim assistance when only one month's entitlement
was at issue, 168 a situation which gave rise to so much resentment on the part of some
administrators that by the mid- 1990s some delivery sites were openly ignoring interim
assistance orders. 169 The problem was exacerbated by chronic backlogs throughout
the 1990s which meant that it often took the Board up to, and sometimes more than,
a year to render a decision in a case.
The delivery system's dissatisfaction with SARB was picked up by the Harris Con-
servatives in opposition. Their attacks on NDP social assistance policy often included
attacks on the role of the Board in allowing people to "get around" the rules and
especially on the role of interim assistance. After the 1995 election, the Harris
government moved against the SARB almost immediately. In 1995 the government
announced that four expiring appointments would not be renewed for budgetary
reasons, then appointed four new members-three of whom had run for office as
Conservatives and lost and one of whom was particularly known as an anti-welfare
crusader' 70-without prior notice to the Chair.171 The Premier and Cabinet Ministers
defended the appointments on the ground that "we wanted individuals who would take
a tough stand on welfare and welfare fraud" (despite the fact the Board has no role to
play with respect to welfare fraud).172 Since then, the government has openly aban-
doned the practice which had developed under previous goverments of a public hiring
and appointments process and has continued to appoint members to the SARB based
on party affiliation. By the time the OWA appeals system comes into effect, it appears
that all members appointed by previous governments will be gone from the Board.
b. Appeals under the OWA
The OWA makes potentially dramatic changes to the appeals system. Even where a
right to appeal exists (and many important decisions are not appealable at all173), the
167. FBA s.14(2). According to SARB policies for granting interim assistance, it did not consider the
merits of the appellant's case in assessing an order, so as not to "prejudge" the issue under appeal.
168. Obviously, denial of assistance could be equally determinative; few people could survive without in-
come for months or years waiting for a decision by the before the Board.
169. See R. Ellsworth et al, "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review" (1994), 10 J.L.& Social Pol'y
1 at 10-11.
170. See Ontario, Standing Committee on Government Agencies, Intended Appointments (Evelyn Dodds)
Hansard (13 December 1995), where the issue of many of Dodds pre-appointment comments on
welfare and welfare recipients was raised. Dodds had earlier caused another stir with a statement to a
Legislative Committee that "if you depend on the government to support you, you give up your right
to privacy because the taxpayers' right not to have their money abused is greater": Ontario, Standing
Committee on the Legislative Assembly, Hansard (19 January 1994) M-204.
171. Ellis, "Dramatic Departures in Appointments Policies", supra n.162.
172. Ibid.
173. Subsection 26(1) provides that any decision affecting eligibility for a benefit or the amount of a
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effectiveness of the appeals system as an independent check on social assistance
administration and as a arbiter of legality in any meaningful form has been greatly
truncated. This is not so much the result of any single change as the cumulative effect
of many small changes to the Tribunal, its powers, the appeals procedures and the
circumstances within which it will operate.
i) Internal reviews
An appealable decision under the OWA must now proceed first through a mandatory
"internal review". 174 This is a new process: previous legislation contemplated a
possible review before a decision was made final, but in practice this requirement was
largely ignored. 175 Proposals for an "internal" appeals system are not new. An informal
internal review prior to appeal was recommended by the Transitions Report and most
subsequent reviews of the welfare system. Delivery agents (and recipients) have
tended to support an informal method of dispute resolution, and an internal review
process arguably has many benefits. Unfortunately, the OWA is effectively silent about
the process except to say that reviews will not be governed by the Statutory Powers
Procedure Act. 176 The Act permits regulations with respect to internal reviews, but
most procedural details will probably be left to delivery agents and experience
suggests wide local variation.
177
Whether internal reviews in practice will adequately safeguard those involved remains
to be seen, but there are many grounds for concern. Any form of internal review will
be heavily weighted towards the delivery system's perspective. Clients can be subject
to pressures to "admit" wrongdoing or to abandon claims. Many people proceeding
through the internal review will be vulnerable to abuse and intimidation or to more
subtle pressures (and it is not clear whether benefits will be continued pending
review). 178 It is not known whether advocates will be permitted and, if so, whether
benefit is appealable, but this is subject by s.s26(2) to several exclusions, including decisions to pay
allowances to a third party and decisions to grant or refuse employment assistance. Grounds of ap-
peal may be further restricted by regulation. There is no statutory obligation even to give notice (let
alone reasons for) a decision in respect of which there is no right of appeal; OWA s.24. In theory a
non-appealable decision might still be subject to a common law duty of fairness; in practice any right
requiring access to the courts would be effectively meaningless.
174. OWA s.27.
175. In theory under the old system, a person had 10 days in which to make written representations to the Direc-
tor after notice of a proposed decision to refuse, cancel or suspend benefits: FBA ss.13(l), (2), (3); GWA s.
10(3); O.Reg.537 s.17.1 (as amended by O.Reg.386/96). In practice, these requirements were commonly ig-
nored, although many offices did have an informal post-decision review process, as discussed below.
176. OWA s. 27(4).
177. Many local offices do have post-decision informal review procedures. Advocates' reports on these
procedures vary. In some parts of the province pre-appeal screening reportedly has been able to
resolve most issues; in others, however, internal review is said simply to intimidate clients. While
some internal review procedures involve a new party for the review, some simply contemplate a fur-
ther "discussion" with the caseworker who has already sanctioned the client. It is not known whether
OWA regulations will require changes in any of the existing procedures.
178. Many of the specific concerns about internal review are very similar to those often raised about
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clients will be advised of this right. The Ministry has historically been hostile to the
idea of counsel at internal reviews and there is certainly nothing in the current political
climate to suggest a shift in this position. 179 Finally, even if there are no procedural
problems with the process, the addition of another mandatory step before getting
access to the formal appeals process will inevitably deter some people from pursuing
possibly valid claims.1 80
ii) Appeals to the Social Benefits Tribunal
Disputes which cannot be resolved through the internal review process may be
appealed to a new appeals body, the Social Benefits Tribunal. While the Tribunal looks
superficially like the Social Assistance Review Board, a close reading of the Act shows
a number of changes which will significantly reduce the independence of the Tribunal
and keep it under much closer government control. It has reserved broad ranging
regulation making powers in respect of the appeals system, while the Tribunal itself has
no explicit rulemaking powers. 181 A detailed review of the problems in the restructuring
of the appeals system is not possible here, but several issues may identified.
First, it will be much harder to get to the Tribunal at all. The OWA raises the threshold
for granting interim assistance and, more importantly, makes interim assistance a
recoverable overpayment if the appellant is unsuccessful; in practice, this is likely to
deter many people from appealling at all. 182 The Act also now imposes numerous
pre-hearing requirements which will pose barriers to access. These include the obliga-
tion to specify the reasons for appeal at the time of appeal, a power to dismiss
"frivolous and vexatious" appeals and, most importantly, a new power to demand
pre-hearing disclosure from appellants. 183 Probably none of these powers will serious-
mediation (although the internal review is not a mediation process). For a more thorough review of these
issues in the context of adjudication and vulnerable clients, see I. Morrison & J. Mosher, 'Barriers to Ac-
cess to Civil Justice for Disadvantaged Groups", in Rethinking Civil Justice: Research Studies For the
Civil Justice Review, Vol. 2 (Toronto: Ont. Law Reform Comm, 1996) 639 at 667-673.
179. Ontario, MCSS, Report of Internal Appeals Project Committee, Recommendations for Enhancing the
Family Benefits Internal Appeals Process, (November 1989) at 6; "[t]he committee feels that the
Ministry cannot communicate to a client an invitation to discuss an issue in an open, informal enviro-
ment on the one hand and on the other suggest a client consider engaging a legal advocate. There-
fore, the committee rejects the notion supported by legal clinics and advocacy groups that letters of
intent to clients should make reference to this right...".
180. Research in other jurisdictions suggests that many clients do not proceed to a second tier appeal in a
two-tier system after losing initially because of feelings of defeat and exhaustion. Carney, "Welfare
Appeals and the ARC Report: To SSAT or Not to SSAT: Is that the Question?" (1996) 4 Australian
J. Admin. L. 25 at 31, citing D. P. O'Connor, "Effective Administrative Review: An Analysis of
Two-tier Review" (1993) 1 Australian J. Admin. L. I at 7.
181. OWA s.74(l) 27-33. Administrative tribunals do have a residual general power to make rules of pro-
cedures in certain areas under s.25.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedures Act.
182. OWA s.30, 32. Many of the advocates with whom I have discussed these changes believe that the effect of
making interim assistance recoverable will be to deter the timid and discouraged from pursuing appeals,
regardless of the strength of the case, rather than necessarily deterring people with weak cases.
183. OWA s.28(1), s.33, s.34.
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ly impede access for represented appellants, but historically only about a quarter of
all appellants to the SARB have had a legal representative. 184
Even if an appellant manages to get to the Tribunal, its powers to act are greatly
restricted. The Tribunal will have little scope for independent interpretation of the Act
and regulations. In a move obviously intended to quash once and for all the problem
of an appeals body that did not consider itself bound by Ministry interpretations and
policy, under the OWA Ministerial policies will have the force of regulations and will
thus bind the Tribunal (and presumably any further appellate court). 185
Finally, whatever the scope of the Tribunal's powers, how it will be staffed must be a
cause for concern. Apart from the return to openly patronage appointments already
evident, institutional independence is seriously compromised under the OWA.
Tribunal members will no longer be appointed for fixed terms and appointments may
be "subject to conditions set out in the order" of appointment.186 Even if the SARB
membership reflected a pro-appellant bias that needed correction as charged by the
critics, the response has been wildly out of proportion. These problem extends beyond
the social assistance system: the Harris government has wiped out years of work
towards a merit-based appointments process for all Ontario tribunals-an achieve-
ment that was precarious enough under previous governments. Indeed, some observers
are openly arguing that "if the current crisis of confidence amongst the administrative
law community is not addressed, there will be negative consequences that will impact
on the legitimacy, effectiveness and quality of administrative justice in Ontario". 187
D. POVERTY, DESERT AND THE STATE
Welfare "reform" in Ontario is not an isolated phenomenon. Social welfare programs
are under intense pressure in most industrialized countries, especially in the English
speaking countries which have traditionally had the weakest commitments to universal
social citizenship. There are broad similarities in most of the reform prescriptions.
184. In 1995-96, almost half of all appellants were entirely unrepresented, while another 24% were repre-
sented only by a family member or friend; see Ontario, MCSS, Social Assistance Review Board:
1995-96 Annual Report at 33, Table 13.
185. Pursuant to OWA s.74(2)3 the Minister may make regulations "prescribing policy statements which
shall be applied in the interpretation and application of this Act." The Tribunal is also barred from
considering Charter issues, although this is of much less practical importance; see s.67(2)(a). Indeed,
given that SARB often took years to decide Charter cases brought before it, it was not a particularly
convenient or expeditious alternative to the Courts.
186. OWA s.61(1).
187. C. Flood & T. Walker Administrative Tribunal Appointments in Ontario: The Current Crisis of Con-
fidence [unpublished] (1997); S.R. Ellis, "An Administrative Justice System in Jeopardy", Speech to
the CBAO Workers Compensation Section, September 24, 1997, & "Dramatic Departures in Ap-
pointments Policies", in Administrative Law: Dramatic Departures in a Downsizing State (Depart-
ment of Continuing Legal Education, Law Society of Upper Canada, December 1997), & ; J.
McCormack, "The Price of Administrative Justice" (1998) [forthcoming, Canadian Labour and
Employment Law Journal].
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They generally involve reductions in benefit levels either through active cuts or
through passive erosion, cutting back or ending universal income transfers in favour
of "targetted" programs, increased conditionality of transfers on various forms of
labour market participation or active employability enhancement, the offloading of
state responsibility for meeting needs to the voluntary sector and to families (i.e.,
women) and so on. Within these similarities, though, there are substantial differences,
depending on the starting points for restructuring, the main political influences on the
decision makers and many other factors. In North America, where heavy reliance is
placed on means-tested social assistance for income maintenance, "workfare" is
particularly important; a policy usually pursued in conjunction with a general attack
on the deservedness of recipients couched in "a discourse on fraud and abuse that
denigrates people on welfare". 188
Commenting on the cyclical nature of public support for the welfare transfer, Andrew
Armitage writes,
The paradox of social welfare transfers is that, de facto, they tend to destroy [the
consciousness of sharing a common fate with one's fellow citizens]. The effect of
stigma on public support is to divide citizens into two separate social classes, the
"givers" and the "receivers". The givers are identified with industry, self-support and
benificence, while the receivers are identified with laziness, dependence and self-inter-
est. The welfare transfer thus creates alienation and undercuts the basis of its own public
support. The transfer based on a shared citizenship is debased by the dynamic into a
transfer based on the principle that those who are the givers are justified in expect-
ing that the recipients conduct themselves on terms dictated to them. 189
The Harris government's welfare policy is deeply rooted in this dichotomy and
depends for ongoing support on maintaining the image of welfare recipients as "other".
This welfare policy has been explicitly premised on an understanding of poverty as
personal shortcoming, encapsulated in the most important code word of modern social
policy, "dependency". One would be hard pressed to find a public utterance on welfare
in Ontario in which the word "welfare" is not linked with the word "dependency". 190
"Workfare" is intended to give people "opportunities to break the cycle of dependency
on welfare". 191 In its politer moments, dependency is linked to the supposed lack of
188. A. Noel, "The politics of workfare" in Sayeed, ed., Workfare: Does it Work? Is it Fair (Montreal: In-
stitute for Research on Public Policy, 1995).
189. A. Armitage, Social Welfare In Canada Revisited, 3rd ed., (Oxford University Press, 1996) at 46.
190. For an analysis of the evolution of the modem usages of "dependency" in social welfare debates and
the way in which the word has come to code personal failing in the U.S.m see N. Fraser and L. Gor-
don, "A Geneology of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State" (Winter 1994)
Signs 309. While their analysis cannot be applied to Canada without consideration of the different
race and gender connotations in the two countries, it is nevertheless a valuable unpacking of the
function of this concept in supporting the newly dominant neoliberal ideology of poverty.
191. This phrase was used repeatedly by Janet Ecker, Minister of Community and Social Services, and other
Tory politicians during introduction and debate on Bill 142. The "cycle of dependency" (with its strong
and deliberate connotations of a transmitted "welfare culture") is perhaps the bedrock stereotype of con-
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skills or training of a large portion of the population, but it easily slips into images of
laziness and moral degradation. The OWA reflects a kind of "tough love" paternalism.
Welfare dependents, like children, cannot expect to be treated as full citizens. 192 To
ensure that they behave responsibly, their benefits can be paid to third parties; because
they cannot be trusted to be properly motivated to escape the "welfare trap", they must
be compelled to participate in employment measures decided for them under threat of
sanction; and their presumed tendency to cheat means that they must be kept under
constant scrutiny not only by state officials but by public volunteers.
At the symbolic level at least, Ontario Works does represent a "revolution" of sorts.
If social assistance under the Canada Assistance Plan can be seen as the high point
of "entitlement" ideology in Canadian welfare systems (whether or not this vision was
ever actually recognized in practice), the pendulum has gone a long way in the opposite
direction with the OWA. Section one of the Act states:
The purpose of this Act is to establish a program that,
(a) recognizes individual responsibility and promotes self reliance through
employment;
(b) provides temporary financial assistance to those most in need while they
satisfy obligations to become and stay employed;
(c) effectively serves people needing assistance; and
(d) is accountable to the taxpayers of Ontario.
Thus the implicit distinction between "citizen/taxpayer" and "welfare/dependent" is
embedded in the Act from the outset. Several related themes emerge from looking at
this section in the context of the rest of the Act and the larger program issues. At least
in theory, CAP-era social assistance programs had as an ultimate goal "the provision
of adequate assistance to and in respect of persons in need and the prevention and
removal of the causes of poverty". 193 The related concepts of poverty and adequacy
have disappeared from the new welfare reform rhetoric; indeed, an important and
highly successful element of neoconservative attacks on welfare provision for the last
decade has been the attack on "poverty" as a coherent or measurable concept.
194
servative welfare mythology, although there is no evidence that such a phenomenon exists.
192. The metaphor of government as "parent" is drawn explicitly by many supporters of the Harris
government's social policy directions. For example, Christopher Sarlo, whose "poverty lines" are
frequently used to justify claims that welfare rates are "too generous", argues that "[a] wise parent
will allow her children independence appropriate to their age.... The task of providing assistance to
people in need is analogous to the dilemma of the wise parent"; Fraser Institute, "Poverty in Canada-
1994" Fraser Forum (February 1994) at 53.
193. CAP, supra n.7, Preamble.
194. Social policy discourse around poverty until the 1990s used a number of different "poverty"
measures, but there was a substantial consensus that for social policy purposes what was important
was relative deprivation. Although never explicitly promulgated as such, the Statistics Canada Low
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At a program level, the disappearance of "adequacy" as a social policy goal has led
to a particularly perverse inversion of the concept of equity in social provision. Once,
social assistance was assumed to reflect a "social minimum" below which in theory
no one would be allowed to fall. Now, social assistance is more and more explicitly a
social maximum for anyone who does not prove his or her worth to society through
labour. In the OWA itself, the fact that social assistance allowances are now effectively
seen as a fund garnishable by the government to recover unrelated debts illustrates the
degree to which the "social minimum" ideal has eroded. Certainly, the old truism that
welfare rates are inadequate and that those on welfare live in poverty has lost much
of its rhetorical force and capacity to found moral claims on the state. The dominant
standard of appropriate assistance is no longer whether it allows people to purchase
basic necessities, or maintain a level of integration in society, but whether allowances
exceed those in other jurisdictions. 195
Under the OWA, people without the means of subsistence no longer approach the state
as "persons in need" (to use the CAP phrase) with a "right" to a basic social minimum;
they approach as supplicants for a form of state organized largesse, dispensed grudg-
ingly and suspiciously. Now, the sole purpose of assistance to the "able-bodied"-a
phrase used throughout Tory welfare discourse in preference to the "unemployed"
undoubtedly because of its strong connotations of wilful idleness-is to ensure that
they take work of any kind as quickly as possible. The principle that all work, any
work, is better than "dependency" has become an unassailable mantra; so much so that
the Ontario "Children's Minister" can say publicly that cutting welfare allowances to
poor families by 22% is good for children because "stay at home" welfare moms are
such a bad role model. 196
Even for those willing to prove their moral worth by demonstrating their efforts to
become employed, however, the neoconservative vision of the Harris government is
Council on Social Development, 1994). In the last decade, however, there has been a sustained cam-
paign to replace relative poverty measures by the Fraser Institute, a "free-enterprise think tank": see
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used both measure poverty and to set efforts to alleviate it. This has had a major influence on social
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study on the effects of welfare rate changes on neighbouring states stop short of using the phrase "race to
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too grudging to permit direct acknowledgement of a corresponding state respon-
sibility. Indeed, the drafters of the OWA have gone to great length to avoid this. For
the disabled, the only presumptively deserving poor, the government will "recogni[ze]
that government, communities, families and individuals share responsibility for
providing ... supports". 197 Government and community are conspicuously absent
from the OWA at this symbolic level; on a more practical level, as discussed above,
no individual has a statutory right under the OWA to any form of assistance that cannot
be restricted or eliminated altogether by politicians or bureaucrats acting outside direct
political scrutiny.
E. CONCLUSIONS
If the past is any guide, dramatic changes will probably not occur in
welfare. Throughout history, welfare policy has always been largely
symbolic. Myths and stereotypes gain prominence; drastic reforms are
enacted, but actual policy is usually decoupled from administration.
There are many reasons, but usually the policies, as enacted, are too
draconian and more importantly, too costly in the end.
198
-Joel Handler
We cannot know at this point what welfare will look in Ontario in ten, five or perhaps
even two or three years. Ontario Works represents a sharp break from the traditions of
welfare in Ontario since 1967, as discussed at several points throughout this article. Recent
U.S. experience shows how far truncations of welfare entitlements can go in one "reform"
flurry: life time limits on welfare receipt; the abolition of all assistance to single
employable people in some places; denial of benefits for children born to mothers
receiving welfare; denial of benefits to anyone convicted of drug felonies; virtual workfare
armies displacing thousands of former government jobs; denial of social benefits to
immigrants; wholesale privatization of welfare services; and so on. 199 Any or all of these
measures could be instituted by Executive fiat under the OWA without even the need for
further legislative activity (and according to political sources, some are at least under
discussion within government). Whether in fact Ontario will go further in this direction,
though, remains an open question. Most historians and students of social assistance would
agree with Handler's comments that attempts at radical welfare reform almost always falter
during implementation. This may be what happens in Ontario too; as discussed above, for
example, the sweeping workfare promises of the Common Sense Revolution have not
amounted to much in practice.
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Whether or not the most extreme "reform" options ever see the light of day, however,
there is no question that the Harris government's welfare agenda has hit hard upon
hundreds of thousands of Ontario citizens. Some time before Bill 142 was introduced into
the Legislature, I argued with respect to earlier welfare changes that, "[i]f massive cuts
to social programs and social services signal a determined effort to undo the welfare state
at one level, the truncation of legal entitlement is a corollary strategy at the level of the
citizen.... The creation of a 'two-tiered' citizenship in reality, within the liberal legal
mythology of equal citizenship, is advancing quickly in Tory Ontario". 200 The Social
Assistance Reform Act, 1997 is one step further in the dismantling of the "social
citizenship" vision in Canada.
200. 1. Morrison, "Rights and the Right: Ending Social Citizenship in Tory Ontario", in D. Ralph et a], ed.,
Open for Business, Closed to People: Mike Harris's Ontario (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1997) 68
at 77.
